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We test the no-trade theorem in a laboratory financial market where subjects can trade an 
asset whose value is unknown. Subjects receive clues on the asset value and then set a bid and 
an ask at which they are willing to buy or to sell from the other participants. In treatments 
with no gains from trade, theory predicts no trading activity, whereas, in treatments with 
gains, trade becomes theoretically possible. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to 
reach the no-trade equilibrium by pure introspection, but they learn to approach it over time, 
through market feedback and learning. 
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Trade in nancial markets is typically attributed to two types of source: liquidity and hedg-
ing reasons on the one hand, and informational or speculative reasons on the other. The
rst concerns traders who have a private reason, such as hedging risk, portfolio rebalancing,
or a sudden need for cash, to buy or sell an asset. The second refers to situations in which
the value of an asset may be common but uncertain, and trade is generated as individuals
attempt to prot from private information about that asset value. Although the informa-
tional explanation for trade strikes many market observers as plausible, it is at odds with
some celebrated results in the theory of nancial economics, known collectively as \no-trade
theorems." These theorems state broad conditions under which rational agents cannot trade
with each other on the basis of private information alone.
While there are many variants of the no-trade result|see, for instance the classical
contributions of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Tirole (1982), and Sebebius and Geanakoplos
(1983), as well as Aumann's (1976) famous theorem on the impossibility of agreeing to
disagree|they share an underlying logic that is easy to explain. Suppose that two agents
consider trading an asset that has the same uncertain value to each of them. If the agents
begin with a common prior about that value and then receive additional private information
that causes their beliefs to diverge, one might expect to see the agent with more pessimistic
news sell to the agent with more optimistic news. However, a rational prospective seller
must update her beliefs to account for the information revealed by her trading partner's
willingness to buy, and vice versa. If both agents are rational this Bayesian updating has an
inexorable conclusion. A trade at some price p would make it common knowledge that the
agents disagree about whether the expected asset value is greater or smaller than p, and this
in turn would imply that the agents had failed to update as completely as rational agents
should. As a result, trade cannot occur in equilibrium.1
Market practitioners tend to be skeptical about the empirical validity of these theoret-
ical no-trade results. One criticism is that the supporting logic is too subtle for individual
investors to grasp by introspection. Another critique is that these theorems require assump-
tions, such as common priors and common knowledge of rationality, that may not be satised
in real nancial markets (even though they are conventional in the theory literature).2 Oth-
1We neglect for now the knife-edge case of trade at a price equal to the expected asset value, conditional
on both agents' information.
2While we will not attempt a full discussion of the theoretical literature, we should note that there is
a considerable body of more recent work addressing the robustness of the no-trade result. For instance,
Morris (1994) provides necessary and sucient conditions for no-trade results to persist even in the presence
of non-common priors. Sonsino (1995) and Neeman (1996) study the case in which common knowledge is
replaced by quasi common knowledge or common p-belief. Blume et al., (2006) characterize belief restrictions
2ers argue that the volume of trade in nancial market is so high that it would be dicult to
explain on the basis of liquidity and portfolio rebalancing motives alone (for some empirical
evidence on this, see, e.g., Dow and Gorton, 1997). As Ross (1989) puts it \It is dicult to
imagine that the volume of trade in security markets has very much to do with the modest
amount of trading required to accomplish the continual and gradual portfolio balancing in-
herent in our current intertemporal models." While these critiques of the theory may have
merit, they are dicult to investigate with eld data since they hinge on details about the
preferences and beliefs of investors that we cannot hope to observe.
In this paper, we intend to provide a direct test of these no-trade results using experimen-
tal data. By creating an articial nancial market and observing subjects trading behavior
in the laboratory, we can control for many of the unobserved inuences that plague eld
data. We can also control the presence or absence of Pareto gains from trade. In markets
where mutual gains from trade are possible, the no-trade results do not apply. Our main
contribution is to run side-by-side markets with and without gains from trade. By comparing
trading activity under the two conditions, we can assess how eectively, and through which
channels, the no-trade logic is incorporated into the behavior of our subjects.
In our laboratory setting, subjects rst spend some time learning about a noisy relation-
ship between an asset value and two clues. Then they enter a trading phase in which each
subject receives a signal (typically one of the two clues) and has the opportunity to set a
bid price at which she is willing to buy one unit of the asset and an ask price at which she
is willing to sell one unit. A bilateral trade occurs if her bid is higher than her trading part-
ner's ask, or vice versa, with the price set equal to the midpoint of the buyer's bid and the
seller's ask. In markets with no gains from trade, the buyer's payo is equal to the realized
asset value minus the price, while the seller's payo is just the negative of this, so the game
is clearly zero-sum. Payos are similar in the markets with gains from trade, but on top
of this, each party to a successful trade earns an additional xed sum as a \commission."
This trading game is repeated for 30 rounds, allowing subjects ample time to learn from
experience.
The comparison between markets with and without gains from trade provides us with
one theoretical prediction: levels of trade should be lower in the latter than in the former.
If subjects reason purely by introspection, this dierence should be seen immediately, while
if they learn from experience, we would expect levels of trade in these two types of markets
that ensure a no trade result in competitive equilibrium and show that trade occurs generically when these
restrictions are not satised. Eliaz and Spiegler (2007) apply a mechanism-design approach in order to
examine the extent to which non-common priors create a barrier to speculative bets. Serrano-Padial (2007)
provides conditions that rule out all trade, including trades at the expected asset value conditional on pooled
information.
3to diverge over time. A strict interpretation of the no-trade theorems implies a second
prediction: levels of trade in the no-gains markets should be zero. However, this is arguably
a problematic benchmark for a laboratory experiment. Although we were careful to keep
our instructions neutral, the very act of placing subjects in a market and asking them
to set prices probably created some presumption that trade should happen. Also, while
subjects did have an incentive to stay for the whole session (they were paid part of their
show-up fee on a round-by-round basis), it would not be surprising if some of them found
not trading boring and tried to trade for entertainment value alone.3 To take this into
account, we run additional control treatments in which either one or both trading partners'
information is made public. In the latter case, subjects can have no illusion about the scope
for informational trade, while in the former case, the disadvantaged subject should nd his
prospects equally dim. In assessing whether informational trade has been wiped out in our
main treatments with no-gain, we will focus on the residual trade in these control treatments,
not zero, as a benchmark.
Our results oer broad, but not unqualied, support for the theoretical no-trade predic-
tions. Introspection alone does not lead subjects to equilibrium outcomes, as levels of trade
are positive and similar with and without gains in the rst few rounds of trade. However,
over time trade declines substantially in the no-gains markets while holding steady in the
markets with gains from trade. This decline is most pronounced when private information
explains relatively more of the asset value and white noise explains relatively less. Analysis
of these trends reveals an important role for market feedback, particularly losses. Both short
run losses and cumulative trading losses induce subjects to price more cautiously (setting
larger bid-ask spreads). Declining trade in the no-gains treatments (relative to the treat-
ments with gains) can be explained partly by stronger reactions to these losses, and partly
because losses are more frequent when there are no gains from trade.
One corollary of the no-trade results is that in equilibrium it should be impossible to
earn positive rents from trading on private information. We test this implication for the no-
gains treatments with a counterfactual exercise: we ask whether a hypothetical trader with
private information could have made positive expected prots from trade with our subjects.
In our no-gains treatments, these prot opportunities are small and decline over time. This
decline is driven mainly by the scarcity of willing trading partners, not by market eciency:
conditional on trade, prices impound only modestly more private information over time.
While the no-trade theorem is a crucial result in nancial economics, there appears to
be relatively little work that tests it. In the experimental literature, to the best of our
3These concerns are, of course, well known in experimental nance. See, for instance, the considerations
of Lei et al. (2001) in a study concerning bubbles in asset markets.
4knowledge, there is only one other direct test, a recent and independent work by Carrillo
and Palfrey (2007).4 Their treatments study how changes in the trading mechanism and in
the deterministic function mapping signals to the asset value aect the frequency of trade.
In contrast, we include noise in the asset value function and use variation across treatments
to investigate how the ratio of white noise to private information aects trade outcomes
and to establish a benchmark level of trade when mutual gains are possible. Thus, the
two papers are essentially complementary. Carrillo and Palfrey do report one session, with
a bilateral auction and a "sum of signals" form for the asset value, that is similar to our
baseline treatment. They observe a positive initial level of trade that falls by about 50% in
the second half of the session. This downward trend is broadly consistent with the decline
in trade that we report. However, there is no clear pattern of declining trade in their other
treatments, nor can changes over time be linked to learning by subjects. In contrast, we show
that learning from market feedback explains declining levels of trade in all of our zero-sum
treatments. Finally, the level of trade in their experiment seems to be generally higher than
in ours, although a formal comparison is impossible on the basis of a single session.
Our work is also complementary to the substantial literature on experimental asset mar-
kets (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1982; Plott and Sunder, 1982, 1988; Copeland and Friedman,
1991; for surveys, see Duxbury, 1995; and Sunder, 1995). For the most part, this literature
addresses questions about market eciency and information aggregation, and the predictive
power of rational expectations equilibrium, in settings with gains from trade. While we will
comment briey on the rst two issues in discussing our results, our focus is on settings
where prices are not observed in equilibrium because no-trade occurs.5
Also related to our study is experimental work on the \betting game" by Sonsino et al.
(2002) and Svik (2004). The betting game is a simple zero-sum game in which asymmetric
information is generated by giving agents dierent information partitions. Several steps of
reasoning (iterated deletion of dominated strategies) should lead agents not to bet (Sebebius
and Geanakoplos, 1983).6 Sonsino et al. (2002), however, nd that subjects frequently fail
4This paper is roughly contemporaneous with ours. (We started our experiments in November 2003, and
nished the study in 2008.)
5Plott and Sunder (1988) report one set of treatments in which subjects share the same common value for
an asset that is traded in a dynamic double auction. They nd that prices generally converge to the correct
(pooled private information) asset value in later rounds of the experiment. They also mention in passing
that the number of trade declines in later rounds, but the main focus of their paper is elsewhere, and they
do not present any formal results on this.
6The study by Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) is extended by Sonsino (1998) to the case where there
exists a small probability that players accept the bet when they should reject it. Generically, the result of
Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) proves to be robust. Recently, the betting game has been revisited by
Jehiel and Koessler (2006) in a framework that allows for bounded rationality. Players are assumed to be
boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states
into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes.
5in this type of reasoning: betting occurs frequently and slows down over time only slowly.
Svik (2004) has replicated this study, but with changes including higher stakes and use
of the strategy method. She nds that dominance violations and betting occur much less
frequently than in Sonsino et al. (2002) and that subjects' behavior is consistent with two to
four steps of iterated reasoning. These betting game studies are complementary to our work
in that they operate in a setting tailored for very sharp tests of narrow hypotheses about
iterated dominance and levels of reasoning. In contrast, our interest is in understanding how
market feedback and other factors inuence subjects' pricing decisions (and thus levels of
future trade) in a setting that is closer to a real-world market.
While there do not appear to be any direct tests of the no-trade theorem using eld
data in the literature (unsurprisingly, given the diculties discussed above), large empirical
trading volumes have spurred many authors to study why investors trade. Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001) use data from the Finnish stock market to identify determinants of buying
and selling activity. They nd that investors are reluctant to realize losses, that they engage
in tax-loss selling activity, and that past returns and price patterns aect trading. Odean
(1999) studies investors with discount brokerage accounts and restricts attention to trades
for which liquidity, rebalancing, and tax loss motives can plausibly be ruled out. He nds
that these trades generated net losses, even before accounting for transaction costs, and oers
various conjectures about why these trades were made. These papers are complementary to
our own: we exclude most of the determinants of trade that they study in order to focus
more sharply on the role of private information, which their data cannot address. Future
work linking eld and laboratory data would certainly be valuable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its predictions.
Section 3 describes the experiment. Section 4 illustrates the main results. Section 5 analyzes
subjects' pricing strategies in the experiment. Section 6 discusses the experimental market
eciency. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains some proofs, a description of some
auxiliary results of the experiment and the instructions.
2 The Trading Game
Consider the following trading game played by two risk neutral agents. There is an asset
worth V = A + B + X to each trader, where A and B are random variables drawn from a
joint distribution F and X is drawn independently from FX, with E (X) = 0. We assume
that F is atomless and has a density f that is strictly positive on its interior, in the following
sense: if A  A0  B0  B, and f (A;B) > 0, then f (A0;B0) > 0. Each of the signals A
In this setting, betting can be an equilibrium outcome.
6and B is observed privately by one of the two traders, while neither observes X. We will
assume that A and B each have support S and are interchangeable in F, so the agents can
be considered equally well informed about V .7 From now on, we will identify an agent with
his signal.
In the trading game, each agent will have the opportunity to buy or sell one unit of the
asset from the other. After observing their signals, each agent i submits an order (bi;ai) 2 P2
consisting of a bid price bi and an ask price ai (where P is a compact subset of the positive
real numbers such that supp(V )  P). Whenever one agent's bid price is higher than the
other agent's ask price, one unit is sold from the latter to the former at a price equal to the
midpoint of the bid and ask. More formally,
if aA  bB, A sells to B at p = 1
2 (aA + bB);
if aB  bA, B sells to A at p = 1
2 (aB + bA).
If neither of these conditions holds, there is no-trade between A and B. Alternatively, if
both conditions hold, both trades are carried out. In this case, there is no net transfer of
the asset, but if the two prices are dierent, there will be a transfer payment between the
agents. Notice that this last case is only possible if ai  bi for at least one agent, that is, if
one of the agents oers to sell at a price below his oer to buy.8
Agents maximize expected trading prots, where realized prots are p   V for a sale or
V  p for a purchase. Fixing a strategy for agent B, i.e., a map from any signal B into a bid
bB (B) and an ask aB (B), agent A's expected payo from placing order (bA;aA) with signal
A is
Pr(bB (B)  aA jA)E (p   V jA;bB (B)  aA) +
Pr(aB (B)  bA jA)E (V   pjA;aB (B)  bA),
with a similar expression for agent B. If the primitives of the game are common knowledge,
then a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game is a strategy prole for both agents in
which each agent's strategy maximizes his expected payo with respect to correct expecta-
tions about his opponent's strategy. We will say that an order strategy is regular if bi and ai
are continuous, dierentiable, strictly increasing functions.9 If agent B's strategy is regular,
7This symmetry will feature in our experimental design. It is not needed for the no-trade result below,
but it is helpful in characterizing some equilibria (of the model with gains from trade) we will present later.
8This case is allowed for the sake of completeness, but it will not turn out be be of any practical im-
portance. As a matter of fact, in the experiment we will not allow subjects to post an ask lower than the
bid.
9Note that our restriction to regular strategies is imposed mainly to streamline the exposition and could
be loosened substantially (at some technical cost).
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A similar expression holds for the expected prot of agent B.
Having described our economy, we can now prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There is no BNE in regular strategies for which trade occurs with positive
probability.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that agent A sells to agent B with positive probability.
Then, there exists some A, with aA (A) = p, such that Pr(bB (B)  p jA) > 0. Dene
B to be the signal for agent B for which bB (B) = p. (We cannot have bB (B) > p for all
B 2 S since agent A would then be able to raise his ask price slightly and continue to win
with probability one but at a higher price. Continuity then implies that B exists.)
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The second term is equal to 1
2 Pr(bB (B)  p jA), which is strictly positive by hypothesis.
Given strictly monotonic strategies, this implies that p   A   B > 0 and f (B jA) > 0.















Since f (B jA) > 0 implies f (A jB) > 0, this rst order condition cannot be satised
unless A + B   p  0, which is a contradiction.
An identical argument rules out a positive probability of sales from agent B to agent A,
completing the proof.
The intuition of the proposition follows the standard line of no-trade results. Conditional
on a trade at price p, neither agent can expect a strictly positive gain, because then the
other agent would have to expect a loss. Trade in which both agents expect zero prots
cannot survive either. If there were signals Aand B and a price p = E (V jA;B) such
that agents with these two signals traded at p, then the seller must be in the position of
8trading with all buyers with signals B  B and earning zero prots when the buyer's signal
is B. But then he could strictly improve his payo by raising his ask price: he would lose
nothing by dropping the sales to B = B buyers and he would improve his sale price versus
the B > B buyers. The same logic implies that a buyer making zero prot purchases at the
margin would be better o if she were to reduce her bid price. Thus, the agents' exercise of
market power rules out even zero expected prot trades.10
The restriction to regular strategies simplies the proof of the proposition considerably
but does not appear to be essential. For example, if we relax strict monotonicity to allow
bid and ask functions that pool at particular prices, the no-trade result does not change.11
Note that equilibria without trade always exist. One such equilibrium is the strategy prole
in which both agents always ask for the highest price in P and always bid the lowest price
in P, but there are, of course, many others.
2.1 The Trading Game with Gains from Trade
Our baseline treatments will replicate the trading game just described in the laboratory. It
would be unreasonable to expect experimental subjects to align perfectly with theory, so in
practice we expect to see some positive frequency of trade. If we observe, for example, that
trade occurs in 10% of subject pairings, we will need a method to evaluate whether this
should be viewed as a failure or a qualied success for theory. Toward that end, we now
amend the trading game to include gains from trade. Thus revised, the trading game does
admit equilibria with positive levels of trade. By running treatments with small gains from
trade, we construct a frame of reference for the baseline results: if the baseline treatments
generate levels of trade near the \upper bound" of the gains treatments, this is bad news
for the theory. Alternatively, if the baseline treatments diverge from the gains treatments in
the direction of zero trade, this supports the theory.
The trading game with gains from trade is identical to the baseline model described above
10In rational expectations competitive equilibrium versions of the no-trade theorem, individual agents
cannot inuence the price as they do here, but risk aversion often plays a similar role in shutting down zero-
prot trade. We expect that adding risk aversion should only strengthen the no-trade result for our trading
game. We have not attempted a proof of this since risk neutrality is a relatively reasonable assumption for
the payos at stake in our experiment.
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 p, otherwise sellers with signal  A
and buyers with signal B would not be willing to trade at p. But because V is strictly increasing in the
















, contradicting the pair of
inequalities above. Loosely, the most and least enthusiastic sellers in one pool of signals, and the most and
least enthusiastic buyers in another pool of signals cannot all be kept indierent about the prospect of trade
with each other.
9with one exception: now, whenever a trade takes place, the seller and buyer each receive a
xed amount c in addition to their trading prots. One could think of c as a type of xed-fee
commission. Consequently, every trading opportunity is associated with total gains from
trade equal to 2c. One can imagine introducing gains from trade in many alternative and
perhaps more realistic ways, but this formulation has two appealing features: it is very easy
for subjects to grasp and it will permit us to compute equilibria.
This game typically has many equilibria, including the trivial no-trade equilibrium which
survives the presence of gains from trade. Since we are interested in upper bounds on the
level of trade that should be observed in the laboratory, we focus on identifying the equilibria
that generate the highest levels of trade. Figure 1 presents symmetric equilibrium strategies
for some parameter specications that we will use in two treatments of the experiment,
later called treatments GT1 and GT2. In these treatments, the commission c is equal to
5 (which is equivalent to 10% of the average asset value). The parametric distributions of
A, B, and X used for these treatments can be found at the beginning of Section 3.3. For
each treatment, we show the equilibrium bid and ask functions for which the probability
that a pair of agents trades is highest. In Table 1 we present summary statistics for these
equilibria, which requires dening some terms.12 Given bid and ask strategies (b;a) and a
signal realization S, we dene an agent's spread to be a(S)   b(S). His average spread is
just his expected spread over all signal realizations. We dene the value transferred between
two agents to be jV   pj if trade occurs and 0 otherwise. The average value transferred
is the unconditional expectation of this transfer payment (including events in which trade
does not occur).13 Conditional on trade, the absolute price prediction error is dened to be
j"pj = jp   E (V jA;B)j. The percentage of trade is just the equilibrium probability that a
pair of agents trades.
We will develop these concepts more as we go forward, but for now note that an agent
with a larger spread will tend to trade more rarely and at more advantageous prices. The
value transferred measures how much one party gains and the other loses on average, net
of any commissions. Value transferred is a reasonable measure of average prots and losses,
but because the asset value contains noise that neither trader observes, value transferred is
not a good measure of price eciency. For this, we have the price prediction error which
captures (in the event of trade) how closely the price tracks the best feasible forecast of V ,
12In the table, for the sake of comparison, we also present the equilibrium statistics for the cases of c = 2
and c = 8.
13Value transferred is typically on the order of a few pence per match. Later, in the results, we will report
the total value transferred over ve rounds of a treatment. With ve sessions per treatment and 16 matches
per round, this represents the sum over 400 matches, so the values there will be on the order of several
pounds.
10given the agents' pooled information.































It is also worth noting that the equilibrium outcomes are quite sensitive to the value of
the commission. Even a small change (e.g., from 5 to 8) changes the percentage of trade
and the other values considerably. In the remainder of this section we provide a relatively
informal discussion of how these equilibria were computed. Readers who wish to skip to the
description of the experiment should feel free to do so, while those who are interested in the
more technical details will nd them in the appendix.
Table 1: Equilibria with Gains from Trade: Summary Statistics
c % Trade Value Transferred j"pj Average Spread
GT1
2 2% 0.03 0.42 60.59
5 14% 0.24 1.07 33.28
8 43% 1.09 2.04 25.51
GT2
2 8% 0.86 0.42 24.80
5 62% 6.33 1.98 5.68
8 97% 11.49 2.02 2.89
Value transferred, absolute price prediction error and average spread are expressed in pence per match.
Let us say that a bid function b is separating on a price interval P if there is a signal
interval S0 S such that P = b(S0) and b is strictly increasing and dierentiable on S0.
11Alternatively, say that b pools at a price p if the set of signals S for which b(S) = p has
positive measure. The same terminology will apply to ask functions. A strategy (b;a) is fully
separating if each function is separating on its entire image. Our equilibrium analysis will be
directed toward constructing symmetric equilibria in fully separating strategies, if they exist.
Where they do not, we look for equilibria that are \almost fully separating." There are two
practical reasons for this approach. First, our main objective from the analysis is a theoretical
upper bound on the level of trade that we can take to our experimental treatments. Many
equilibria of this trading game typically exist, ranging from the trivial no-trade equilibrium
to equilibria with various patterns of pooling and separation. Characterizing all of these
equilibria is unrealistic, but extensive numerical exploration indicates that the highest levels
of trade are achieved in equilibria with separating (or almost separating) strategies. Second,
equilibria with more extensive pooling require buyers and sellers to coordinate expectations at
particular, and sometimes arbitrary, prices. A priori, delicate coordination of this sort among
experimental subjects seems unlikely, and we see no evidence of clustering at particular prices
in our data.
To x ideas, consider a prospective symmetric, fully separating equilibrium (b;a) with
inverse order functions  = b 1 and  = a 1. Consider the bid ~ b of a buyer14 who observes
signal B and faces an opponent who observes A and uses strategy (b;a). The expected payo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dA: (1)
In a symmetric equilibrium, this payo will be maximized at ~ b = b(B). Notice that here,





therefore p = ~ b) can be positive even when the expected value of the asset is below the sale
price (A+B ~ b < 0). The fact that this marginal trade can be simultaneously protable for
both the buyer and the seller is, of course, what allows trade to survive. The protability of









portion of the integrand.
If ask prices fall relatively quickly with declining A, then buying from sellers with low signals
can be protable. Alternatively, if ask prices drop slowly as A declines, then the standard
lemons logic applies: expected prots can be negative even if the marginal purchase is
protable.
These considerations help to illuminate the optimality conditions for equilibrium. If the




, then local optimality dictates
14Of course, every agent can act as both a buyer and a seller. The shorthand term \buyer" (or \seller")
should be taken to mean \an agent acting in his capacity as a buyer (or as a seller)."
12a rst order condition for (1) that can be written as a dierential equation for 0. When 0 is
too large, a slightly higher bid suces to attract additional sellers with much higher signals,
which tends to be prot improving. Conversely, when 0 is too small, the buyer can reduce
its bid and purchase from essentially the same pool of sellers, but at a better price. The
rst order condition ensures that neither of these deviations is attractive. Similar conditions
apply to best response asks, leading to a rst order condition involving 
0. Together, these
comprise a pair of coupled dierential equations in  and  that must be satised to meet
local optimality.15
A candidate solution to these dierential equations must be checked to ensure that the
equilibrium strategy is also a global best response to itself. For example, a bid may be
locally optimal and nonetheless generate an expected prot in (1) that is negative; in this
case, the buyer would be better o submitting a high bid that has no chance of trading.
The potential adverse selection problem here|that only agents with bad news about V are
willing to sell|is standard. The twist here is that imposing global optimality will tend to
place additional limits on the slopes of b and a: as noted above, larger b0 and a0 tend to
mitigate the adverse selection problem while smaller slopes tend to exacerbate it. For a
buyer, the idea is that as the pool of sellers (A) deteriorates, the adverse selection problem is
less severe if the price (linked to a(A)) also declines quickly and more severe if a(A) declines
slowly. In practice, these global conditions must be checked on a case by case basis. For
some parameter values, they are satised, and a fully separating equilibrium exists. In other
cases they fail, usually for a subset of the highest and lowest signals. In these cases, it is
generally possible to construct a patched equilibrium with separation over some range [pl;ph]
of prices. Sellers (buyers) who would be instructed by the rst order conditions to ask (bid)
for more than ph will instead place non-competitive asks (pool at ph). The situation at pl is
just the reverse.
3 The Experiment
We ran the study in the Experimental Laboratory of the ELSE Centre at the Department
of Economics at UCL between November 2003 and May 2008. We recruited subjects from
the ELSE experimental subjects pool, which includes mainly UCL undergraduate students
across all disciplines. They had no previous experience with this experiment. Overall, we
recruited 280 subjects to run 7 treatments. For each treatment we ran 5 sessions and each
session involved 8 subjects.
The sessions started with written instructions given to all subjects (reported in Ap-
15Of course, local optimality requires checking a second order condition as well; this condition is satised.
13pendix). We explained to participants that they were all receiving the same instructions.
Subjects could ask clarifying questions, which we answered privately.
The experiment consisted of two phases. In a rst phase (\learning phase") subjects
could learn how the value of an asset was determined. In a second phase (\trading phase")
they had the possibility of trading the asset.
3.1 The Learning Phase
In this part of the experiment, subjects went through 30 rounds in which they were provided
with certain information about the value of the asset and then asked to predict such a value.
Recall that the asset value is V = A + B + X. Out of the 8 subjects in each session,
four, randomly chosen, were exposed rst only to clue A and then to both clues. The other
four were exposed rst to clue B and then to both clues. Subjects could learn the relation
between the clues and the asset value by repeatedly predicting this value on the basis of the
clue(s) and receiving feedback afterwards.16
A more detailed description of this phase is as follows. First, in the instructions subjects
were informed that the value of the asset (in the instructions simply labeled as a \good")
was between 0 and 1 pound sterling. They were also told that the asset value depended on
various factors and that two of these were \clue A" and \clue B." Second, on the computer
screen, they were shown a table with a sample of 10 values for the asset and 10 for the
corresponding clue (clue A for the rst group and clue B for the second).17 The purpose
of the table was to give subjects the chance to begin to form inferences about the relation
between the clue and the value. When subjects were ready to proceed, they moved on to a
prediction stage. In each round of this stage, the computer generated a new triple (A;B;V ).
Each subject was shown his corresponding clue (either A or B) and asked to predict the value
of the asset based on the clue they received. After the prediction, the true asset value was
revealed. This was repeated for 15 rounds. Then subjects went through a stage of learning
with both clues. First, they were shown another sample table on the screen, this time with
10 values of the asset and of both clues. Then, in the 15 last rounds, they observed the value
of both clues, made their predictions and received feedback as above.
In order to induce accurate predictions, we used a standard, quadratic, scoring rule: for
16In the theoretical model outlined in the previous section, we computed the equilibria under the assump-
tion of common knowledge of the relation between clues and the asset value. Since most facts about the
world are not revealed by public announcement, common knowledge is often motivated as the (idealized)
culmination of a long period of learning in a stable environment. Our objective here is to take that motiva-
tion seriously: subjects had a reasonable, and realistic, chance to approach common knowledge of the model
through this learning phase.
17The table (identical for subjects receiving the same clue) is reported in the Appendix.




subjects were paid according to their prediction in two randomly chosen rounds: one selected
from rounds 11-15 and another selected from rounds 25-30. Of course, after each prediction,
when subjects were informed of the true value of the good, they could also see on the screen
the potential payo for that prediction.
3.2 The Trading Phase
In the second phase of the experiment, subjects had the opportunity to trade in a series of
30 rounds. The trading game in each round resembled the theoretical model described in
Section 2. In each round subjects received a clue (as in the learning phase) about the asset
value and had to submit two numbers: a bid price and an ask price.18 They were also given
the option of selecting a \no-trade" button, which automatically set the bid and ask prices
at 0 and 100 pence, respectively.
The subjects, who in the rst 15 rounds of the learning phase had seen clue A (B),
received clue A (B) also in the trading phase. Each of the four subjects receiving clue A was
matched (i.e., had the opportunity to trade) with each of the four subjects receiving clue B,
thus generating 16 pairings. Trade occurred between two subjects whenever the bid price of
a subject was higher than the ask price of the other subject. In this case, the transaction
price was set equal to the average of the buyer's bid and the seller's ask. Otherwise there
was no exchange of the asset between those two participants. As a subject could trade with
up to four other subjects, it could happen that, for instance, a subject bought in one match,
sold in another and did not trade in the others.
For each round, we gave subjects an endowment of 20 pence, regardless of whether trade
occurred or not. In addition to this, they could earn (or lose) money by trading. For each
purchase, the subject earned the dierence between the true value of the asset and the price.
Similarly, for each sale, he earned the dierence between the price and the true value. For
the treatments with gains from trade, a subject was given an additional 5 pence for each
trade.
After each trading round, subjects received feedback: they could see the true value of
the asset, the bid and ask prices set by the four participants of the other group (whom he
was matched with), the price of the transactions (if any) and, the payo for that round.
Finally, before leaving, subjects lled out a short questionnaire, in which they reported
some personal characteristics (e.g., gender, age, knowledge of mathematics) and answered
questions on their behavior and on their beliefs on other subjects' behavior in the experiment.
18We imposed the constraint that the bid had to be weakly lower than the ask.
15Immediately after completing the questionnaire, subjects were paid in private and could leave
the laboratory. The payment was equal to the sum of the per-round payos of the trading
phase, the selected two round payos of the learning phase and a xed fee of $5. The average
payment per subject was $16.50 (approximately $32) for a session lasting about 2.5 hours
on average.
3.3 Experimental Design
We ran seven treatments in total, and our main focus here will be on four of these: two
baseline treatments (B1 and B2) with no gains from trade and two gain from trade treatments
(GT1 and GT2) with a positive commission. All the treatments diered only in the Trading
Phase, whereas the Learning Phase was identical across them.
In all treatments, the asset value was equal to the sum of the two signals plus a noise
term: V = A+B+X. The components of V were always coordinated so that V would have
support on the interval [0;100]. The clues A and B were random variables composed of a
common factor z and two independent factors ~ A and ~ B:
A = ~ A + z, B = ~ B + z:
The main purpose of the common factor z was to camouage slightly the simple relationship
between the clues and the value, presenting subjects with a learning task that is neither too
dicult nor trivially obvious. In every treatment, z was distributed uniformly on an interval
of length 15. Because z appears twice (once in A and once in B), it explains 30 pence of the
potential 100 pence of variation in V .
The remaining 70 pence of variation in V comes from information ( ~ A) contained only in
clue A, information ( ~ B) contained only in clue B, and from noise (X). We study two settings:
one in which the ratio of variation due to private information relative to noise is high (B1
and GT1), and one in which that ratio is low (B2 and GT2). In the high information-noise
ratio treatments, ~ A and ~ B are distributed uniformly and independently on [1:5;33:5], while
X s U [ 3;3]. In the low information-noise ratio treatments, ~ A and ~ B are distributed
uniformly and independently on [5;20], and X s U [ 20;20]. Finally, in treatments B1 and
B2, we set c = 0 (no gains from trade), while in GT1 and GT2 we set c = 5.
The variation in gains from trade (B1 and B2 vs. GT1 and GT2) provides context for
evaluating whether our no-trade predictions are close to being satised. Theory predicts
no-trade in B1 and B2 but allows for positive trade in GT1 and GT2, so if we nd (for
example) that trade is much rarer in B1 than in GT1, we can take this as support for the
theory.
16Our interest in the ratio of private information to noise is motivated more informally.
The equilibrium prediction of no-trade in B1 and B2 is completely unaected by the relative
importance of ~ A, ~ B, and X. However, in our experiments, we expect subjects to learn about
the asset value and the protability of trade through trial and error. In other words, with
due respect to introspection, it seems likely that they learn the consequences of ignoring
an opponent's private information from experience. Because in B1 the losses suered by
ignoring an opponent's information can be more severe (jA   Bj can be larger) and harder
to misattribute to bad luck (X is smaller), we might expect subjects to approach the no-trade
prediction faster in B1 than in B2. Alternatively, if subjects persistently fail to account for
opponents' private information, then trade should remain higher in B1 than in B2, because
disagreements about the asset value (reected by jA   Bj) will tend to be larger in B1.
For the two treatments with gains, the variation in ~ A and ~ B does play a role in the
formal equilibrium predictions, but the white noise X does not. As discussed in Section 2,
a higher upper bound level of trade is predicted in GT2 than in GT1, essentially because
larger dierences in private information in GT1 force agents to trade more cautiously. These
predictions, however, only apply if our subjects have learned to model asset values correctly.
An alternative conjecture is that more \model uncertainty" will persist in GT2 (because X
is larger) and that this will tend to disrupt subjects from coordinating successfully on trade
at a price near V .
In addition to these four main treatments we ran two control treatments.19 We label these
control treatments as CE (control-equal information) and CU (control-unequal information).
Both these treatments serve as controls for B2 and GT2 since they have in common the same
parameter distributions.20 In treatment CE, every subject received both clues A and B. In
other words, this was a treatment with symmetric information. In treatment CU, instead, in
odd periods, the four subjects who in the rst 15 rounds of the learning phase had seen clue
A received clue A while the other four subjects received both clues A and B; in even periods,
the inverse was true, i.e., subjects who in the learning phase had observed clue B received
clue B and the others received both clues A and B. In other words, in this treatment some
subjects were better informed than their counterparts.
These control treatments are intended to measure residual levels of trade that are plau-
sibly unrelated to dierences in private information. In CE, there is literally no private
19We ran one additional control treatment which was identical to B2, except with lower incentives. Specif-
ically, in each round, a subject traded only with one (randomly matched) subject with the other signal,
rather than with all four opponents. The results were generally similar to B2, and we do not report them
here.
20We did not run control treatments for B1 and GT1 for reasons that will be clearer later, when we discuss
the results.
17information, while in CU, one of the two trading partners always has no private information.
Nonetheless, we can imagine other reasons that subjects might trade in these settings. Sub-
jects may trade because they believe themselves to be superior predictors of the asset value,
because they are risk-loving or overcondent, or for a variety of other reasons related to non-
standard preferences or behavioral biases. Moreover, subjects may trade simply because
they nd not trading boring. These motives can be very dicult to observe and disentangle,
even in a laboratory setting, and our only objective here is to try to control for them. If
one is willing to believe that these sources generate similar amounts of trade in all of our
treatments, then we can identify information-based trade o of the dierences between our
baseline treatments and these controls.
4 Evidence About Strategies and Trading Activity
Because our principal objective is to understand whether and how the no-trade result is
conrmed in the laboratory, we will concentrate our analysis on the trading phase of the
experiment. Although the learning phase is mainly in a supporting role, we will discuss
some of its highlights in the appendix.
4.1 An Overview: Spreads and Trading Activity
4.1.1 B1 and GT1
We begin with an overview of the two treatments in which the ratio of private information to
noise was high, B1 and GT1. We focus on three outcome variables: percentage of matches
with trade, value transferred, and spreads. The percentage of trade is the outcome that
should be zero for the baseline treatments, according to theory.21 Note that the percentage
of trade does not tell us anything about the size of gains and losses from trade. If trade
is frequent but always occurs at a price close to V , then the deviation from theory might
be regarded as minor; conversely, if trade is rare but always involves large gains and losses,
we might hesitate to say that the theory is conrmed. Valued transferred, which is equal
to jV   pj if trade occurs or 0 if not, lets us assess this. In this section, we report the total
value transferred for each treatment over all of the matches in a block of ve rounds.22 Both
of these outcomes are produced by the interaction of subjects' order strategies. The average
21The unit of observation here is a match and not a subject, in order to avoid duplications. Recall that in
each round there are 16 matches, since four subjects in group A can trade with four subjects in group B.
22With ve sessions per treatment and 16 matches per session, this means that the number we report is
the total value transferred over 400 matches. For comparison, note that the equilibrium value transferred
reported in Table 1 refers to one match only.
18spread measures those strategies directly; subjects who set larger spreads will trade less often
and at more favorable prices.
Table 2 summarizes these outcomes, grouping the 30 rounds of play into six 5-round
blocks. The trend over time is strikingly dierent in the two treatments. In treatment B1
the average spread starts at approximately 24 and then increases monotonically to reach
almost 40 by the end of the experiment. In GT1, instead, it starts at approximately 20
and remains almost constant for the entire experiment. As a result of these dierent pricing
strategies, the trading activity also looks signicantly dierent.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment: B1 and GT1
Rounds
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
Average Spread
Treatment B1 24:03 23:05 28:93 31:33 33:61 39:40
Treatment GT1 19:43 21:15 20:55 20:18 21:10 21:68
% of Matches with Trade
Treatment B1 30:0 22:5 20:3 17:8 14:2 7:3
Treatment GT1 35:0 20:7 35:7 38:5 31:2 30:7
Value Transferred
Treatment B1 9:64 7:78 7:63 6:07 4:72 2:07
Treatment GT1 11:78 6:60 11:38 11:77 9:24 7:19
For each treatment, averages are computed over all 5 sessions. Average spread is the average individual spread, expressed in pence. Value
transferred is the sum of jV   pj, expressed in pound sterling.
In treatment B1 the percentage of trade decreases steadily from 30% to 7:3%.23 In GT1,
instead, there is no clear trend and the frequency of trade is almost always above 30%. The
pattern for value transferred is similar: the two treatments begin at similar levels, but value
transferred declines monotonically in the treatment with no gains while remaining roughly
constant in the treatment with gains. By the end of the experiment the dierence between
the two treatments is substantial. Tests for the last 15 rounds of trade indicate that these
dierences are statistically signicant at any reasonable signicance level: spreads are higher
23As mentioned in the introduction, Palfrey and Carrillo (2007) report one session with a structure similar
to B1 with the following key dierences: (i) their asset value is the sum of signals with no noise, and subjects
are told this; (ii) their subjects have xed roles - sellers cannot buy and buyers cannot sell; (iii) buyers are
price-takers; (iv) there are 20 rounds. They report that the level of trade drops from 31.7% in the rst
10 rounds to 21.7 in the second ten rounds. If sales to or from either partner had been possible, as in B1,
presumably both numbers would be larger. In other treatments that are less similar to ours, they nd smaller
declines or increases in trade over time. While we reiterate that a formal comparison with this single session
is unjustied, it is interesting to note that in our treatment B1, the frequency of trade is 26.1% in the rst
10 rounds, 19.0% in the second 10 rounds, and 10.8% in the nal ten rounds. Had our experiment ended
after 20 rounds, the decline in trade would have looked rather modest.
19( p-value = 0:000) and the percentage of trade and value transferred are signicantly lower
(p-value = 0:000 and p-value = 0:001 respectively) in the baseline treatment.24
Mean spreads alone cannot explain all of the nuances of trading outcomes; other factors
including subjects' accuracy in predicting the asset value and heterogeneity in spreads also
matter. We will return for a more detailed look at the determinants of trade later, but for
now, the basic picture seems clear. Behavior starts at similar levels with and without gains,
but in the no gains treatment spreads quickly increase, driving trade down to a very low
level by the end of the experiment.
4.1.2 B2 and GT2
Now we discuss the results in treatments B2 and GT2. Recall that these treatments dier
from the previous ones in that there is less private information and more noise in the com-
position of the asset value. Table 3 shows the evolution of spreads, percentage of trade and
value transferred over time. For B2, the mean spread is steadily increasing over time, start-
ing at 20 and ending at 31. As a result, the percentage of trade falls almost monotonically
from 28:6 to 19:6 and so does value transferred, from an initial value of $11:02 to a nal one
of $6:13. These outcomes start at initial levels that are similar to B1 and trend in the same
direction, but the trend is weaker: nal spreads are lower, and trade is higher, than in B1.25
Treatment GT2 is qualitatively similar to GT1: our three outcome variables remain
fairly constant over time in both treatments. The levels of the average spread and value
transferred are not signicantly dierent between GT1 and GT2, but the percentage of
trade is signicantly lower in GT2 (at the 5% level).26
Signicance tests over the last 15 rounds of play conrm that the divergence between the
gains and no gains treatments is not as strong for B2 and GT2 as it was for B1 and GT1.
The average spread is roughly 29 for B2 versus 19 for GT2, a dierence which is signicant
at the 10% level (p-value = 0:059). The percentage of trade is 19 in B2 and 22:4 in GT2,
while value transferred is $7:91 in the former treatment and $11:51 in the latter; neither of
these dierences is signicant at the 10% level (although value transferred is close, with a
p-value of 0:119). A natural conjecture is that learning is slower in B2 because it is harder
24Observations are not independent, since the same subjects set the spreads many times, interact within
each session and feature in dierent trading matches per round. We take into account cross-sectional as well
as time-series dependence and compute standard errors by bootstrap (1000 replications), clustering at the
session level. This remark applies to all our results involving standard errors. If not otherwise specied, we
compare treatments pairwise using a one-tailed test.
25These dierences between B1 and B2 are not statistically signicant over the nal 15 rounds, except for
value transferred, which is signicantly higher in B2 (at the 5% level). For the comparison of B1 and B2 we
use a two-tailed test.
26For the comparison of GT1 and GT2 we use a two-tailed test.
20for subjects to distinguish losses due to bad luck from losses due to an incautious strategy
when asset values are noisier. We will have more to say about this in Section 5. The fact that
realized trade does not diverge much between B2 and GT2, despite the increasing spreads
in B2, appears puzzling at rst glance. One must bear in mind that these statistics do not
control for the degree to which the two private clues \disagree." If the size of jA   Bj aects
the likelihood of trade (and we will see in Section 4.2 that it does), then stochastic variation
in this clue disagreement across treatments can have a confounding eect when we compare
their levels of trade. When we control for jA   Bj in Section 4.2, the divergence between B2
and GT2 looks substantially sharper.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment: B2 and GT2
Rounds
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
Average Spread
Treatment B2 20:04 21:91 25:98 26:74 28:48 31:52
Treatment GT2 20:67 18:74 16:67 16:27 20:30 22:76
% of Matches with Trade
Treatment B2 28:5 23:7 16:0 24:0 13:5 19:6
Treatment GT2 25:7 21:5 20:7 24:5 23:2 19:5
Value Transferred
Treatment B2 11:02 12:06 7:21 11:87 5:74 6:13
Treatment GT2 14:74 7:58 8:16 14:28 10:63 9:62
For each treatment, averages are computed over all 5 sessions. Average spread is the average individual spread, expressed in pence. Value
transferred is the sum of jV   pj, expressed in pound sterling.
4.1.3 Controls for B2 and GT2
The preceding results tell us that trade in both baseline treatments diverges from the gains
from trade treatments (albeit less substantially for B2 with respect to GT2) and trends
toward zero. Nevertheless, there appears to be a residual level of trade that is not erased
with experience (at least not within 30 rounds). This is particularly true for treatment B2.
We would like to know whether this residual trade survives because subjects insuciently
account for asymmetric information, or whether some other cause is to blame.
To address this, it is worth looking at the results for our two control treatments, CE
and CU (Table 4). Recall that these two treatments had the same parameterization of the
signals and asset value as B2 and GT2, but they diered in which information was provided
to subjects. In CE there was no private information at all: every subject received both clue
A and clue B in every round. In CU, the asymmetry in private information was stark: in
21each match, one subject received both clues and the other received only one.
In treatment CE, trade cannot be generated by dierences in private information, since all
subjects have the same information. Nonetheless, trade hovered just above 10% throughout
the treatment and sank only to 10:7% over the last ve rounds. Similarly, the value trans-
ferred remained fairly constant over time and was equal to $6:64 in the last ve rounds.
Statistical tests show that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the percentage of trade
and the value transferred in the last 15 rounds are equal in treatments B2 and CE (p-value
= 0:106 and p-value = 0:248 respectively).
In treatment CU, only one subject had private information, so the imbalance should
have been hard for the disadvantaged subject to ignore. Nonetheless, trade remains at
11:5% over the last ve rounds, with value transferred of $4:79. Over the last 15 rounds,
value transferred is not signicantly dierent between CU and B2 (p-value = 0:278). The
percentage of trade appears to be lower in CU than in B2, but the dierence is only signicant
at the 10% level (p-value = 0:098).
Together the evidence from these two control treatments suggests that much of the resid-
ual trade in B2, perhaps most of it, should not be attributed to subjects underestimating
their opponents' private information. We can suggest at least three explanations for the per-
sistence of a roughly 10% level of trade, even when subjects do not have private information.
One is that subjects disagree about how the asset value is related to the clues. Another is
that subjects' strategies vary due to experimentation and errors, and this can generate some
trade. Third, and importantly, attempting to trade was the only activity in which subjects
could engage. It is possible that some subjects tried to trade out of boredom or a sense that
this was what they were supposed to do.
4.2 Trading Activity and Dierential Information
In order to illuminate the parametric and behavioral roots of dierences in trade between
B1/GT1 and B2/GT2, it is useful to write down a model of how strategies and signals interact
to generate trade. Below, we develop a very simple, ad hoc model in which strategies are
linear in signals. While this model is only illustrative and has no theoretical foundation, one
can see from Figure 1 that linear strategies are roughly consistent with equilibrium in GT1
and GT2.
Suppose that subject i uses the following bid and ask strategies with a signal S:
b(S) = mS   b + "ib , a(S) = mS +  a + "ia.
22Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment: CE and CU
Rounds
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
Average Spread
Treatment CE 21:02 21:49 21:62 30:92 32:41 34:85
Treatment CU 20:06 25:81 22:82 28:81 29:43 34:85
% of Matches with Trade
Treatment CE 12:5 19:5 14:5 13:0 12:7 10:7
Treatment CU 23:5 17:0 16:7 14:2 13:0 11:5
Value Transferred
Treatment CE 5:00 7:04 8:44 6:18 5:68 6:64
Treatment CU 13:51 7:98 7:35 6:81 8:24 4:79
For each treatment, averages are computed over all 5 sessions. Average spread is the average individual spread, expressed in pence. Value
transferred is the sum of jV   pj, expressed in pound sterling.
That is, all agents use the same linear strategies in S, with constants  a and  b, and hetero-
geneity in the form of idiosyncratic zero-mean shocks "ib and "ia. Let us endow subjects i
and j with signals A and B respectively, and suppose, without loss of generality, that A < B.
Then i will sell to j with probability
Pr
 
"ia   "jb < mjB   Aj   Spread

,
where Spread =  a +  b. The event that the agent with higher signal sells to the agent with
a lower signal involves a similar expression, but because A   B replaces jB   Aj on the
righthand side of the inequality, it is less likely. For our illustrative purposes, we will assume
that the expression above approximates the total probability of trade.
This formulation helps to unpack some of the determinants of trade. All else equal,
trade is less likely when the average spread is higher, and more likely when the subjects'
private signals disagree more, or when they put more weight on that information (higher m).
Greater heterogeneity across subjects (higher variance for the shocks) has a mixed eect. If
the righthand side tends to be negative (making trade unlikely), then higher variance shocks
should tend to raise the chance of trade. If the righthand side tends to be positive, then
the opposite is true. Perhaps more intuitively, when spreads are large, it takes an unusually
high bid and an unusually low ask to get trade|more heterogeneity makes this event more
likely. Conversely, when spreads are small, trade will tend to occur unless disrupted by an
unusually low bid and high ask, so the eect of heterogeneity goes the other way.
234.2.1 B1/GT1 versus B2/GT2
This framework can inform a comparison between B1/GT1 and B2/GT2. First, let us x
behavior and consider only the parametric dierences across the treatments. In treatments
B1 and GT1, dierences in private information (jB   Aj) tend to be larger than they are in
treatments B2 and GT2; all else equal, this tends to generate relatively more trade in B1 and
GT1. Now, consider what happens as subjects adjust their strategies over time. When there
is an increase in the average spread (as in B1 and B2), the probability of trade falls, but
the decline will be more dramatic in cases where the dierence in signals is more frequently
large. Where jB   Aj is more often small, the probability of trade is already fairly small to
start with. This suggests that the failure of B2 and GT2 to diverge sharply may be in part
related to the fact that dierences in subjects' signals tend to be small.27 If we condition
on realizations in which A and B dier a lot, the divergence between B2 and GT2 may look
more pronounced.
This hypothesis is investigated in Table 5. We revisit our tests for cross-treatment dier-
ences in means over the nal 15 rounds, conditioning only on those rounds with the following
signal realizations: \low" jA   Bj (jA   Bj  5), \high" jA   Bj (jA   Bj 2 [10;15]), and
\very high" jA   Bj (jA   Bj  20). This grouping is motivated by the fact that 15 is
the largest possible dierence in treatments B2 and GT2; the last grouping applies only to
treatments B1 and GT1, for which jA   Bj could be as large as 32.
The dierences between B1 and GT1 continue to be signicant for all three jA   Bj
groupings. More interestingly, both percentage of trade and value transferred are signi-
cantly lower in B2 than in GT2 (at the 5% level) if we condition on matches where the
signal dierence is high (but not when the signal dierence is low). This is consistent with
our hypothesis and suggests that, when there are no gains from trade, experience and mar-
ket feedback are fairly eective in pruning down the number of trades instigated by large
dierences in private information about the asset value (in both treatments B1 and B2).
4.2.2 Actual versus Theoretical Outcomes in GT1 and GT2
This framework can also shed light on the dierences between our experimental outcomes
with gains from trade and the equilibrium outcomes reported earlier. The percentage of
trade in GT2 is below the theoretical upper bound reported earlier, while trade in GT1
substantially exceeds its theoretical upper bound. Note that the observed spreads in the two
treatments are similar, but we know that large dierences in signals are much more common
27Of course, a concomitant cause may be the dierent way subjects adjusted spreads over time as a function
of the feedback they received. We will turn to this issue in the next section.
24Table 5: Testing Dierences across Treatments Conditioning on Dierential
Information.
jA   Bj low jA   Bj high jA   Bj very high
Spread














% of Matches with Trade





























Tests refer to cross-treatment dierences in means over the nal 15 rounds. We report cluster-robust bootstrap t   statistic, and, for the reader's
convenience, the corresponding p-value in parentheses. jA   Bj low indicates that jA   Bj 2 [0; 5); jA   Bj high indicates that jA   Bj 2 [10; 15);
jA   Bj very high indicates that jA   Bj  20. For Treatments B2 and GT2, there are no observations for jA   Bj very high.
in GT1 than in GT2. Considering the linear model discussed above, it is a simple matter of
mechanics that subjects will manage to coordinate on trade more consistently in GT1 than
in GT2. Furthermore, subject heterogeneity should, if anything, reinforce this dierence.
We would expect the noisier environment of GT2 to produce more dispersed estimates of the
asset value, which may lead to more dispersed price strategies. As discussed above, greater
dispersion in strategies should tend to reduce the chance of trade when spreads are smaller
(as they are in GT1 and GT2).
This argument pushes the question back to the level of strategies. In particular, why
do spreads in GT1 remain substantially below their equilibrium levels? Some intuition can
be gleaned from the equilibrium strategies in Figure 1. Low signal buyers (below about 12)
and high signal sellers (above about 38) nd they cannot make positive expected prots and
drop out of the market. This tends to unravel the market from the ends: if there are no
low signal buyers, then a low signal seller faces more severe adverse selection and must set
higher prices, but this in turn means that the next tier of buyers get lower seller signals for
the same price, forcing them to bid more cautiously, and so on. This process is obviously
sensitive to the behavior of subjects with extreme signals.
In practice, subjects with low signals (less than 12) lose 1.58 pence on average when
they buy. Their average bid prices with low signals do appear to react to these losses but
only slightly, falling from 20.55 in rounds 1-10 to 18.41 in rounds 21-30. Similarly, subjects
25with high signals (greater than 38) lose 13.75 pence on average when they sell. Again, their
ask prices rise only slightly over time, from 72.38 in rounds 1-10 to 76.62 in rounds 21-30.
However, buying with a low signal or selling with a high signal are relatively rare events -
each occurs less than once per subject per 30 rounds. The prots of subjects with extreme
signals are dominated by trades going the other direction (selling with a low signal or buying
with a high signal), and these overall average prots are positive. Given this, it may not
be too surprising that subjects do not pay sucient attention to avoiding buying with a
low signal or selling with a high signal. But as long as these traders are in the market, the
unraveling described above stalls, leaving the overall level of trade high.
5 Market Feedback and Trading Activity
Let us now examine the extent to which those changes in strategy can be explained as
a response to feedback from the market. The strategic variable that we focus on is the
spread. Using a regression framework, we study how round-by-round market outcomes
aect the spreads that individuals set over time. For this purpose, we assume the following
autoregressive data generating process for the individual spread:
Spreadit =  + Spreadit 1 + x
0
it 1 + ei + uit, (2)
where i and t denote the player and the round, respectively.
The column vector xit 1 comprises various information that player i observes at round t
before choosing Spreadit. It includes both short run and long run trading outcomes. Short
run outcomes are summarized by two binary variables. One of these takes value 1 whenever
player i's total trading prots in round t 1 were positive (Gainit 1); the other takes value 1
whenever player i's total trading prots in round t 1 were negative (Lossit 1).28 Long run
market outcomes are summarized by TProfitsit 1, the total trading prots that player i has
earned in all rounds up to and including t 1.29 We also want to consider the possibility that
subjects learn from or react to each other, so we include OSpreadit 1, the average spread
set by player i's opponents in round t   1.
The error structure in equation (2) features an individual unobservable component ei,
invariant over trading rounds, and an idiosyncratic disturbance term uit. The individual xed
eect ei allows for heterogeneity in the conditional mean of Spreadit across individuals. We
28Of course, since we consider a dummy for gains and one for losses, a dummy for the case in which i did
not trade in round t   1 is omitted.
29Trading prots include the commission c, in treatments with gains from trade, but do not include the
20p per round xed payment that subjects received.
26assume that, conditional on the unobserved individual specic eect, uit is uncorrelated with
past realizations of spread and past market outcomes.30 Namely,
E [uitjSpreadit 1; xit 1; ei] = 0. (3)
The Fixed Eects (FE) estimator is biased for a dynamic model such as equation (2). As
shown by Nickell (1981), however, the bias decreases with the time dimension of the panel
and vanishes asymptotically as time goes to innity. In our experimental data set, each
player is observed for 30 periods, corresponding to the number of rounds in each session of
the experiment. As this large number of usable observations per subject is likely to make
the FE bias rather small, we estimate equation (2) by FE despite its dynamic structure.31
The design of the experiment poses a further econometric issue. Subjects within a ses-
sion interact with each other over time, and this can introduce correlation across individual
observations within a session, although dierent sessions remain independent. We assume
that spatial correlation within sessions is caused by the presence of interaction factors that
are unobservable and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables on the right hand side
of equation (2). Although the magnitude of such correlations across players due to unob-
servables is likely to be of a modest order, we take into account the potential presence of
cross-dependence in uit and compute standard errors by bootstrap, clustering at the session
level. Such a procedure is also robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in uit and
has been shown to perform reasonably well when the number of clusters is relatively small
(Cameron et al., 2007).
In order to aid comparisons across treatments, we estimate equation (2) pooling all the
data together, but allowing each explanatory variable to have a treatment-specic eect.
Formally, we run the regression







0 j + ei + uit; (4)
where Dj is a binary variable taking value 1 when Treatment = j, with j = B1, GT1, B2,
GT2, CE, CU. The estimation results for equation (4) are presented in Table 6. In Table 7,
30As individual current spreads necessarily aect current market outcomes and subjects' market outcomes,
there exists an immediate feedback from Spreadit to future values of xit 1. This rules out strict exogeneity
of the regressors even in a static model.
31We also estimate the parameters of equation (2) using a rst-dierenced GMM approach  a la Arellano-
Bond (1991). Overall, the estimated coecients for the market outcomes variables are similar to the ones
reported below. Nevertheless, estimation accuracy is lower. Since it is very dicult to predict changes in
spread and trading outcomes using lagged spreads and outcomes, the use of weak instruments can plausibly
cause the GMM estimator to perform poorly in this framework (Bound et al., 1995). For this reason, we
prefer the FE estimation results.
27we report additional results in which the only change is the inclusion of a treatment-specic
linear time trend (variable Round).32 The time trend provides an indication of whether there
is systematic learning about spreads that cannot be explained directly by market outcomes
(such as introspection, perhaps).
Table 6: FE, Dependent Variable Spreadit (time trend excluded)
Treatments
B1 GT1 B2 GT2 CE CU
Spreadit 1 0.381*** 0.243* 0.121*** 0.282*** 0.364*** 0.201*
(0.108) (0.127) (0.033) (0.099) (0.103) (0.104)
Gainit 1 3.424*** 0.868 -0.457 2.361** 1.178 2.379
(1.441) (1.651) (2.027) (1.024) (1.251) (1.705)
Lossit 1 9.577** 3.372** 6.451*** 6.297*** 7.390*** 6.360***
(4.149) (1.630) (1.306) (2.230) (2.573) (1.143)
TProfitsit 1 -0.097*** -0.008 -0.060* -0.011 -0.012 -0.063***
(0.038) (0.011) (0.034) (0.008) (0.040) (0.019)
OSpreadit 1 0.213** 0.045 0.163* 0.102** 0.107*** 0.226***
(0.093) (0.040) (0.093) (0.048) (0.044) (0.054)
Cluster-robust bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at 1%, ** indicates signicance at
5%, * indicates signicance at 10%. Sample size: 6936 observations.
The autoregressive coecient, , is positive in all treatments and considerably below 1.
This indicates that spreads evolve over time with a moderate degree of persistence.
In a nutshell, when it comes to short run market feedback, losses matter, but gains
do not. The dierential eect of losses with respect to the no-trade event is consistently
positive across treatments, indicating that subjects set higher spreads in a round after a
trading loss than they do in a round after not trading. The logical interpretation is that such
subjects hope to avoid further losses by demanding more favorable prices. The magnitude
of this eect is larger in the treatments with no gains from trade than it is when there
are gains (9:58 and 6:46 vs. 3:37 and 6:30). Such a dierence is negligible for treatments
B2 and GT2, but quite substantial for B1 and GT1. This indicates that the decline in
trade in B1 relative to GT1 occurs through at least two channels. First, subjects in B1
make losses more often (because they are not rescued by the commission), and this induces
them to set relatively higher spreads. In addition, subjects' reactions to losses are stronger
when there are no gains from trade. The second channel suggests that introspection and
32To make sure that the market feedback variables were not picking up a more complicated, nonlinear time
trend, we also tested a specication with dummy variables for each round. The results were not signicantly
dierent from those reported below.
28market feedback interact: perhaps the knowledge that mutual gains from trade are possible
encourages subjects to remain aggressive even when they make losses. One could conjecture
that in a noisier environment (B2 and GT2), subjects are more focused on model uncertainty
than on the presence or absence of a commission.
We would expect a subject with a gain in one round to try to continue to trade but
improve his prot with a slightly wider spread. The positive coecients that we see for
Gain are consistent with this story, but they are smaller than the Loss coecients and
generally are not signicant. Thus it appears that losses are the principal short run channel
through which market outcomes aect future strategy.
We presume that subjects take long run, as well as short run performance into account
when revising their strategies. Here, long run performance is measured by TProfitsit 1. In
the baseline treatments, average accumulated prots (across subjects) are identically zero in
every round, but in GT1 and GT2, average accumulated prots tend to grow over time (as
trading commissions add up). This means that omitting a signicant time trend will tend to
bias the coecient on accumulated prots in these two cases, so here we focus on Table 7.
Following the prominent role of losses in the short run feedback, our expectation here is that
lower cumulative prots (or larger cumulative losses) should induce subjects to set higher
current spreads. Beyond the reasons discussed before, subjects who have become relatively
wealthier may show more risk tolerance than subjects who have become poorer. This implies
a negative coecient on TProfitsit 1, which is what we nd for our four primary treatments.
Just as for short run feedback, we nd that cumulative losses push up current spreads the
most in treatment B1 and the least in GT1. In the noisier treatments, cumulative losses
again have a weaker eect with gains (GT2) than without (B2), but the dierence is much
smaller. As earlier, the dierence between the gains and no-gains treatments could mean that
subjects perceive the two environments dierently, but in this case there is another possible
explanation. TProfits tends to be centered around zero in B1 and B2 (its median values
are 2 and 7) but is typically larger in GT1 and GT2 (medians of 67 and 83). If TProfits
has a nonlinear eect (e.g., if raising a subject's prots from -50 to 50 aects behavior more
than raising them from 50 to 150 would), then our linear specication would tend to t this
by making its eect larger for B1 and B2. To put the coecients in perspective, at the
end of treatment B1, the subject at the 90th percentile of accumulated prots had earned
approximately 300 pence more than the subject at the 10th percentile. Had there been a
thirty-rst round, the coecient predicts that the less successful subject would have set a
spread about 28 points higher than the more successful one.
Subjects also observe their opponents' strategies at the end of each round, so it is possible
that a subject's spread reacts to his opponents' past spreads. There are several reasons to
29expect such a linkage. One, of course, is that opponents' past spreads may predict current
spreads, and these are relevant to a subject's optimal strategy. Generally, a larger opponent
spread means that at any given price, a more adverse inference must be drawn about V . A
best response will typically involve setting a larger spread oneself in order to avoid losses. A
second possible connection involves learning: since the trading game is symmetric, imitating
opponents may be one technique that subjects use to try to improve their payos. Both of
these arguments tend to support a positive relationship between OSpreadit 1 and Spreadit,
and this is generally what we see in Table 6. The average eect (across all six treatments)
is that a 10 pence increase in the average spread set by subject i's opponents in round t 1
induces a 1:5 pence increase in subject i's spread in round t. The exception is treatment
GT1, where there is no signicant eect. Table 7 suggests that these coecients on OSpread
must be interpreted with caution, as most of them lose signicance when a treatment-specic
time trend is introduced. Much of the link between OSpreadit 1 and Spreadit could simply
reect some other unobserved and omitted variable that causes this time trend.
The treatment-specic time trends in Table 7 (variable Round) are all positive and sig-
nicant, with the exception of GT2. For the four primary treatments, we once again see the
pattern that spreads rise more when there are no gains from trade (B1 and B2), and the
dierence between gain and no-gains treatments is sharper for B1 and GT1. The coecients
imply that holding our other observables xed, spreads in B1 rise by about 10 points relative
to GT1 over the 30 rounds of the experiment. The corresponding dierence between B2
and GT2 is about 5 points. Adding the time trend leaves the market feedback coecients
essentially unchanged, suggesting that there are additional forces, separate from market
feedback, driving the divergence between the treatments with and without gains. Without
more evidence, we must be agnostic about what those forces are. One possibility is that our
simple market feedback specication misses some subtle nonlinear or lagged feedback eects
that are picked up in the time trend. Another possibility is that subjects are learning about
the hazards of the zero sum environments by observing their opponents' outcomes or by
introspection at the same time as they learn from direct personal experience. Whatever its
source, the eect of the time trend for B1 is to raise average spreads by about 16 points over
30 rounds. This eect is about 50% larger than the eect of having lost money in the previ-
ous round, and roughly equal to the eect produced by reducing a subject's end-of-session
trading prots from the 80th to the 20th percentile (about a $1.6 reduction in accumulated
prots).
Overall, spreads exhibit a fairly low persistence and a constant underlying tendency to
move upwards over time that could reect learning during the experiment as well as strate-
gic interaction and emulation among players. While per round gains appear to be of minor
30importance for spread setting, unfavorable market outcomes induce a substantial increase
in spreads to shield against further losses. Subjects seem prepared to reduce the distance
between bid and ask prices whenever the level of accumulated payos is large enough. These
general patterns appear to be quite consistent across the dierent experimental designs,
although the magnitude of the coecients varies from one treatment to another. The dier-
ences across treatments also t a fairly consistent pattern. When subjects react by increasing
their spreads, thus making trade rarer and on more favorable terms, they do so most strongly
in B1 and most weakly in GT1. The responses in B2 and GT2 are of intermediate strength
and the dierence between the two is small. The evidence seems to suggest that in a low
noise environment, subjects recognize an important dierence between the gains and no-
gains settings, and this aects how they respond to feedback. In the noisier environment of
B2 versus GT2, this dierential reaction to feedback is much less pronounced.
Table 7: FE, Dependent Variable Spreadit (time trend included)
Treatments
B1 GT1 B2 GT2 CE CU
Spreadit 1 0.341*** 0.233* 0.097*** 0.273*** 0.330*** 0.173
(0.107) (0.127) (0.027) (0.095) (0.110) (0.110)
Gainit 1 3.960*** 0.961 -0.121 2.858** 0.412 2.125
(1.059) (1.671) (1.614) (1.275) (1.710) (1.383)
Lossit 1 10.729*** 3.465** 6.844*** 6.108*** 6.933*** 6.131***
(3.819) (1.628) (1.256) (2.088) (2.504) (1.191)
TProfitsit 1 -0.092*** -0.027** -0.059* -0.035** -0.009 -0.063***
(0.039) (0.012) (0.034) (0.016) (0.043) (0.017)
OSpreadit 1 0.013 0.057 0.072 0.105** -0.080 0.107*
(0.073) (0.050) (0.058) (0.047) (0.059) (0.059)
Round 0.537*** 0.235** 0.408** 0.232 0.516*** 0.396*
(0.201) (0.107) (0.207) (0.160) (0.162) (0.203)
Cluster-robust bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at 1%, ** indicates signicance at
5%, * indicates signicance at 10%. Sample size: 6936 observations.
6 Prot Opportunities and Market Eciency
So far we have documented the trading activity in our laboratory nancial market and
studied the trading strategies that our participants used. Now we turn to the economic
implications of these strategies. One corollary of the no-trade results is that in equilibrium
31it should be impossible to earn positive prots from trading on private information. Below,
we test this implication in two related ways. First, we estimate how much prot a rational
trader with private information could earn by trading against our subjects. If this prot
opportunity is close to zero, this suggests that even though trade in our baseline treatments
is a deviation from equilibrium, this deviation has minor economic implications. Large prot
opportunities would be more worrying, as these would show that some of our subjects persist
in using strategies that can be easily exploited. Our analysis, which is based on computing
best responses to the empirical distribution of strategies in each treatment, is presented in
the next section.
Second, we ask whether, conditional on trade, the price reects all available public and
private information. This would imply that our subjects tend to trade only at prices for
which both the buyer and seller can expect zero prots, which one might regard as a minor
departure from the no-trade equilibrium. Because the impounding of private information in
prices has been studied extensively, we should point out that our markets dier from those
commonly discussed in the market eciency literature. Because our baseline treatments
have no-trade (and therefore no prices) in equilibrium, for these markets our hypotheses
are somewhat informal since we cannot make theoretical predictions about whether prices
should be ecient. In treatments with gains from trade, we do have theoretical predictions,
but equilibrium prices will depend in part on how the gains from trade are split between
buyer and seller, and this will not be resolved in our two player game exactly as it would be
with a continuum of traders.
6.1 Informational Prot Opportunities
For our baseline treatments, the no-trade theorem implies that positive prots are a dise-
quilibrium phenomenon; thus we expect to see prot opportunities driven toward zero over
time. In this section we test that prediction by considering a hypothetical trader who (as
discussed above) understands the data generating process and is endowed with the same
type of private information (i.e., one signal) as our subjects. For the baseline treatments
B1 and B2, we compute the expected trading prot that this trader could have earned by
using the order strategy that is a best response to the empirical distribution of play by our
subjects. We repeat this exercise twice, computing best responses to empirical play in the
sub-samples of Rounds 1-5 and Rounds 26-30. Our hypothesis is that these best response
prots should decline toward zero over time for B1 and B2.
For treatments GT1 and GT2, the exercise is slightly more counterfactual. The best
response prot of a subject in these treatments mixes the returns to private information
32with the commission c for a successful trade. Because our interest is in isolating prots
attributable to private information, we compute the best response prots of a trader who
does not receive c (but in every other respect is the same as one of our subjects). As a
theoretical benchmark, we also compute the expected prot that this trader would earn with
a best response to the equilibrium strategies for GT1 and GT2 that were derived earlier.
In contrast with the baseline treatments, these theoretical returns to private information
are strictly positive here. This is possible because the GT1 and GT2 equilibria permit some
\mispricing" to survive (as long as it does not exceed c). Our hypothesis is that the empirical
returns to private information should approach these theoretical levels over time. Because
GT1 and GT2 have other equilibria with lower levels of trade, this prediction is not as
compelling as the one for the baseline treatments.
We should emphasize that this exercise presents a snapshot of prot opportunities at one
window in time; if our hypothetical trader were to actually enter the market, he would not
necessarily continue to earn these prots because other traders would begin to adjust their
strategies. Furthermore, computing a best response with respect to a nite sample of play
will tend to overstate expected prots somewhat because the best response will be ne-tuned
to the sample. For all of these reasons, the computed prots should be interpreted as upper
bounds on the returns that a very skilled subject could earn by using his private information.
6.1.1 Methodology
Consider the best response ask a of a subject with signal A who expects opponents to bid
according to a mixed strategy with density g (bjB).33 (The best response bid is handled
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33Assuming a mixed strategy at this stage will allow us to handle heterogeneity in empirical bids more
naturally later.
33where R(A;B;a;b)  1(b  a)
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is the subject's prot from an opponent
signal-bid realization of (B;b), h(B;b)  g (bjB)f (B) is the unconditional joint distribution
of those opponent signal-bid pairs, and w(A;B) 
f(B jA)
f(B) is essentially a kernel that adds
more weight to opponent signals that are likelier given A.
We (and by assumption, our subject) can compute R(A;B;a;b) and w(A;B) analytically,
so if we also know the joint distribution h(B;b) we can compute EAsk (ajA) and nd the
optimal a. Alternatively, if we only observe a nite sample of draws from h(B;b) (as it is the
case for our experiments), we can estimate the expectation and compute a best response with








For each treatment, we compute best response asks with respect to three sub-samples of
opponents' empirical play: all (B;b) pairs in Rounds 1-5, all (B;b) pairs in Rounds 26-30,
and the entire sample of (B;b) pairs in Rounds 1-30, in each case pooling the data across all
sessions. We proceed similarly to compute a subject's best response bid. His total expected
best response prot BR (A) is the sum of his expected prots from buying and from selling.
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6.1.2 Results
These computed best response prots are presented in Table 8. In three of the four treat-
ments, B1, B2, and GT2, the results give strong partial support to our hypotheses: in each
case, opportunities to prot from private information are driven substantially lower over
the 30 rounds of trading. In contrast, informational prot opportunities in GT1 show no
change over time.34 Potential prots in the two baseline treatments start at about the same
level, but decline more slowly when the asset value is noisier (Treatment B2). The stronger
prediction that potential prots should be driven out entirely in B1 and B2 is not supported
in either treatment, but by the end of the experiment even a awless trader could earn no
more than a penny per match in B2, and less in B1. Meanwhile, the prot opportunity in
GT2 approaches its theoretical level. While there is no rigorous basis for predicting what
34The index of convergence in the last row of the table represents the fraction of excess prots in the rst
ve rounds that are still available in the last ve rounds. Values close to zero indicate that most excess prot
opportunities have been driven out by the end of the experiment. Values close to one indicate little change
in prot opportunities over time.
34would happen with additional rounds of trade, a linear extrapolation indicates that around
20 additional rounds would be needed to wipe out all prots in B1 (and about 45 additional
rounds in B2). If (as seems more likely) convergence slows as prots shrink, more time would
be required.
Table 8: Best Response Prots
Treatments
B1 B2 GT1 GT2

(1 30)
BR 1.18 1.23 1.68 1.66

(1 5)
BR 1.69 1.64 1.99 2.10

(26 30)
BR 0.72 1.05 1.92 1.31
Theor:










0.43 0.64 0.96 0.11





BR ) are based on 200 signal-order realizations, while the full sample (
(1 30)
BR ) contains 1200 realizations.
For treatment GT1, it is worth remembering that a subject's expected trading prots can
be decomposed into the product of two terms: his probability of trading, and his expected
prot conditional on trade. We have already seen that trade occurs much more frequently in
GT1 than can be explained by equilibrium theory, and this empirical fact helps to explain
the persistently high prot opportunities in GT1.
6.2 Do Prices Aggregate Private Information?
Expected prot opportunities depend on the probability of nding a willing trading partner,
and on the distance between the transaction price and the expected asset value conditional
on all private information. In this section we discuss the information content of prices. While
the previous analysis was hypothetical (how much prot would a very talented trader make,
given the empirical distribution of signals and strategies), the present analysis is based on
the actual realizations of the signals and on the actual transaction prices.
Recall that the expected value of the asset conditional on all private information is
E (V jA;B) = A + B. We will say that prices are ecient if p = A + B always holds.
Note that what we are requiring is that the price aggregates all information available in our
35economy, that is, that the market is ecient in a strong form.35 More realistically, allowing
for the possibility that prices are noisy, we will say that that prices are ecient on average if
E ("p jA;B) = 0. 36 That is, there may be noise in p (and consequently expected gains and
losses from trading at p), but that noise is orthogonal to private information. Alternatively,
if prices are not ecient on average, we can measure the total variation in "p and try to
determine how much of the pricing error can be predicted using private information.
Under the (strong form) Ecient Market Hypothesis, we would expect prices to approach
eciency (in both senses) over time, as traders become more experienced. However, it is
not clear whether this is the most reasonable prediction for our baseline treatments with
no gains from trade. In these treatments, trade should never occur in theory and becomes
rarer over time in practice. Thus prices arise from thinner and thinner markets over time,
and are generated by the subset of subjects who continue to trade despite incentives not to.
One might be skeptical that these conditions would lead to ecient prices. In our gains from
trade treatments, markets remain thicker (both in theory and in practice). However, in these
treatments there is a 2c surplus to split between the buyer and seller, and their equilibrium
shares of this surplus depend on V . (Sellers rationally mark up their asks more with low
signals (when they are likeliest to sell), and buyers mark down their bids more with high
signals (when they are likeliest to buy).) As a result, equilibrium prices are neither ecient
nor ecient on average, although they cannot be too far from E (V ). Thus for treatments
GT1 and GT2 we predict that prices should approach these equilibrium levels of information
content.
We begin with eciency. Table 9 reports average values of j"pj for each treatment over
the rst and last ten rounds.
The average price error starts at roughly similar levels in all of the treatments (roughly
15% of the average asset value) and tends to decline modestly over time (to around 12% of
the average asset value in Rounds 21-30). Thus, the market is not much more ecient at
the end than it is at the beginning of the experiment.
Next we ask what fraction of this price error can be attributed to private information
that is systematically not impounded in the price by testing whether E ("p jA;B) = 0 holds.
For each treatment, we run a simple OLS specication over all of the matches in which trade
35We do not require the price to reveal the realized asset value, since there is a component of noise X that
not even the aggregation of private information is able to eliminate.
36The price prediction error "p = p E (V jA;B) was dened in section 2.1. Note that, more subtly, prices
can be consistently wrong and still fully reveal private information. For example, if p = 1
2 (A + B), then p
is sucient for E (V jA;B) even though the price is too low. We have checked that prices in our treatments
are not fully revealing in this sense, but those results are not reported here.
36occurs:










where Rounds[11 20] and Rounds[21 30] are dummy variables for the second and the last ten
rounds respectively and v = A+B  50 is the demeaned expectation of V given A and B.37
If the coecients 0, 1 and 2 are all zero, then v does not predict the direction of the price
error, either early in the experiment or in later rounds. Alternatively, if j0j is large but,
for example, j0 + 2j is small, then prices are not ecient on average in early rounds, but
eciency improves (v predicts less of the variation in "p) towards the end of the experiment.
This will tend to be true whenever 0 and 2 (or 1) have opposite signs. If 0 and 2 (or 1)
have the same sign, then price eciency grows worse, not better, over time.
Table 9: Average Value of j"pj
Treatments
B1 GT1 B2 GT2
Rounds 1-10 8.36 7.68 6.58 6.66
Rounds 21-30 7.83 6.81 5.90 5.30
Equilibrium { 1.07 { 1.98
Amounts are in pence.
The coecients on v in Table 10 are all negative and signicant (at the 1% level), indicat-
ing that prices are not ecient on average in early rounds. A negative coecient between -1
and 0 means that as pooled private information about the asset value moves away from the
ex ante expectation of 50, prices move in the same direction, but not as far. The larger (in
magnitude) the coecient, the more sluggishly prices respond to information. Essentially,
information is partially but not fully aggregated in prices since the price tends to be anchored
to the unconditional expected value more than it should.38 The time interaction on v shows
37In principle, more exible specications in which A and B enter separately could also be studied. In
practice, since we nd that E ("p jA + B) = 0 is violated in a very strong and consistent way, teasing out
more subtle interactions between "p, A, and B is of limited interest. Demeaning V has no eect on 0 and
1, but it allows us to interpret the intercept 0 more meaningfully.
38This sluggishness in prices has been observed also in other experiments in which subjects (acting as
market makers) are explicitly asked to predict the asset value and set the price (Cipriani and Guarino,
2005).
37Table 10: A Simple Model for "p: OLS Estimates
Treatments
B1 GT1 B2 GT2
Constant -2.303** -4.311*** -3.908*** -2.321**
(0.95) (1.56) (1.36) (1.00)
Rounds[11 20] -2.385** 1.499 -0.447 4.850***
(1.04) (1.29) (1.77) (1.01)
Rounds[21 20] -0.454 2.476** 2.072 1.917**
(0.87) (1.01) (1.69) (0.94)
v -0.478*** -0.366*** -0.212*** -0.336***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
v  Rounds[11 20] -0.165*** -0.012 -0.211* 0.072
(0.03) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
v  Rounds[21 30] 0.033 -0.081 -0.037 0.079
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
R2 0.55 0.47 0.16 0.22
N 448 768 492 541
Cluster-robust bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at 1%, ** indicates signicance at
5%, * indicates signicance at 10%.
that the amount of information impounded in prices never improves signicantly over time.
On the contrary, there is in some cases (B1 and B2) an appreciable deterioration.
As noted above (Table 9), the size of the total price error j"pj is similar across the
treatments. These results show that in treatments B1 and GT1 (the treatments with more
private information and less noise in V ), more of the price error tends to be explained by
un-impounded private information (large coecients on v and large R2). Conversely, in the
treatments with less private information and more white noise in V (B2 and GT2), less of
the price error is explained by private information, leaving a larger residual that we could
loosely attribute to \model uncertainty." For the gains from trade treatments, we noted
earlier that equilibrium prices are not ecient on average. If we run the same regression
specication on simulated equilibrium data, the coecients on v are -0.099 for GT1 and
-0.236 for GT2. GT2 comes rather close to this prediction toward the end of the experiment,
with 0 + 2 =  0:257, but GT1 does not.
In conclusion, weaving in the prot opportunity results for the baseline treatments, we
can say that in B1 and B2 spreads generally widen, trade grows rarer, and informational
prot opportunities shrink, as predicted by theory. Since conditional on nding a willing
counterpart, prots from private information do persist, the reduction of prot opportunities
is mainly explained by the diculty of nding another participant willing to trade.
387 Conclusion
Theoretical no-trade results oer conditions under which informational trade cannot occur
at all in equilibrium. It is dicult to know whether these theoretical results really fail in
the real world (and if so, why), because generally we can neither observe traders' private
information nor conrm that those theoretical conditions are satised. At the same time,
the consistency violation at the heart of the theory does not shed any light on the process by
which real world traders might arrive at a no-trade outcome. Our paper is a rst attempt
to bridge some of these gaps. In the interest of robustness and external validity, we create
a trading game that is recognizable as a nancial market (albeit a stylized one) and allow
subjects to learn about the data-generating process (asset value and clues) on their own. By
gathering data in the laboratory, we are able to observe subjects' private information and
exclude many other confounding motives for trade. Because we observe trading outcomes
for our subjects from the inception of the market, we are in a position to study the process
by which subjects move toward a no-trade outcome or diagnose the reasons that they fail to
do so.
We nd that market feedback matters: trading losses encourage more conservative strate-
gies, thereby reducing trade. Subjects lose money more frequently when there are no gains
from trade, so feedback tends to drive these markets in the direction of no-trade. There may
also be some role for introspection: in some cases subjects react to losses more emphatically
when they know that trade is zero-sum than they do when mutual gains are possible. This
dierential response is quite pronounced for parameters that make the role of private infor-
mation more salient and less strong when the role of private information is obscured by more
noise. Overall, our results should oer some vindication to both detractors and defenders
of the no-trade theorems' empirical validity. For the latter, the fact that trade is virtually
wiped out in a setting (treatment B1) where traders must learn a noisy information structure
on the y demonstrates that the no-trade logic is not as fragile as sometimes supposed. The
former can counter that when the level of noise rises (treatment B2), informational trade is
driven out much more gradually, and we cannot conclude that it will ever cease entirely. In
our view, these results should probably be seen as points on a continuum; perhaps future
work can more fully trace out the slope of informational trade with respect to the degree of
model uncertainty confronted by traders.
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42Appendix
A Equilibrium with Gains from Trade
In this section, we characterize a class of symmetric equilibria of the trading game with
gains from trade for which trade occurs with positive probability. A symmetric equilibrium
consists of a pair of bid and ask functions (b(S);a(S)), where S is the signal received by the
subject. Signals are drawn from the range [Sl;Sh] according to the joint pdf f (A;B). Since
the signals are identically distributed, we will make the convention that a subject's signal
is labeled A when we are considering his optimal ask price (hence selling to an opponent
with signal B), whereas his signal is labeled B when we are considering his optimal bid price
(thus, buying from an opponent with signal A).
We will say that a bid function is separating on an interval [S1;S2] if b(S) is strictly
increasing on that interval and pooling if b(S) is constant on that interval. (The same
terminology will also apply to ask functions.) The analysis below is designed to identify
equilibria in symmetric, separating strategies. Sometimes no fully separating equilibrium
exists due to \unravelling" at very low and very high signals; in these cases we can typically
amend the analysis slightly to identify semi-separating equilibria with pooling regions at
high and low signals. The general approach that we take to constructing these equilibria is
as follows:
1. The rst order conditions for a separating equilibrium form a system of dierential con-
ditions. We solve this system numerically to identify candidate separating equilibria.
There is a degree of freedom in the initial conditions, and therefore there is typically
a range of candidate equilibria.
2. Second order conditions are checked to ensure local optimality of the solution.
3. The candidate b(S) and a(S) functions from (1) may not span the entire signal space.
If so, we extend those functions, respecting any conditions imposed by equilibrium.
This can introduce pooling at high signals (for b(S)) or at low signals (for a(S)).
4. We check global optimality of the candidate strategy. This is necessary because we
cannot guarantee that an agent's prots are quasi-concave in his strategy. The main
concern is that for some signals the candidate strategy might lose money (even though
it is locally optimal). Agents with these signals would do better by placing non-
competitive orders.
435. Step 4 tends to be an issue, if at all, for very high and very low signals. We adjust
the candidate solution by expanding the set of signals for which there is pooling (and
shrinking the set for which there is separation) to nd the minimal level of pooling for
which global optimality is satised.
An order strategy constructed according to Steps 1-5 will represent a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the trading game. Our main objective will be to examine equilibria of this
form for the parameters in our experiments. We make no claims regarding the general
existence of such equilibria or the non-existence of equilibria with more exotic patterns of
pooling and separation. Below, we elaborate on each of these steps.
A.1 Step 1
A.1.1 First order conditions for a separating equilibrium
Fix a conjectured symmetric equilibrium strategy (b();a()) with the following piecewise
form
b(S) = 0 for S < Bl
b([Bl;Bh]) is strictly increasing, dierentiable, and maps onto P = [pl;ph]
b(S) = ph for S > Bh;
and
a(S) = pl for S < Al
a([Al;Ah]) is strictly increasing, dierentiable, and maps onto P = [pl;ph]
a(S) = 100 for S > Ah:
We will discuss bidding for the highest and lowest signals later. For now we focus on the
intermediate signals for which b and a are conjectured to be increasing. We will establish
necessary conditions for (b();a()) to be a best response to itself on this range. Under
risk neutrality, a subject's strategy regarding purchases does not interact with his strategy
regarding sales, so we can examine these decisions one at a time; we start with the best
response bid. Consider a subject's optimal bid b when he sees signal B and his opponent
is using the conjectured equilibrium strategy. Bidding b > ph cannot be a best response (it
trades exactly as often as bidding b = ph, but at a higher price). Meanwhile, bidding b < pl
earns 0 with certainty. Bidding b = pl is a subject that we will return to later. For now,
consider possible bids b 2 (pl;ph]. Such a bid trades i.
44a(A)  b or equivalently A  (b);
where  = a 1 is increasing and dierentiable on P.
In the event that he buys when his opponent's signal is A, his payo is
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Next, proceed we similarly for an agent's best response ask a, given signal A and equilibrium
bidding by the opponent. An agent whose ask satises a 2 [pl;ph) will sell i.
a  b(B) or equivalently B   (a);
where  = b 1.
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45For these necessary conditions to identify a symmetric equilibrium, they must be satised
when we plug in the conjectured equilibrium strategies; that is, when we plug in  (b) = B
in the rst FOC and (a) = A in the second. Doing this, and relabeling the argument in
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 (p) + c
:
This system of equations characterizes candidate symmetric equilibrium strategies on
(pl;ph). Solving these equations analytically appears to be intractable, but solutions can be
computed numerically using standard techniques, as described next. To compute a solution,
we must choose two initial value conditions for the two dierential equations. This amounts
to a choice about the range of prices [pl;ph] over which trade may occur. Because our
trading game treats buying and selling with complete symmetry, we impose the additional
assumption that
pl+ph
2 = E (V ) = 50; this eliminates one of the initial conditions. However,
one degree of freedom (loosely corresponding to jph   plj) remains, and this creates the
potential for multiple equilibria with dierent levels of trade. This symmetry assumption
and the computation of candidate strategies are detailed in the next section.
A.1.2 Numerical Computation of Equilibrium
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:
With suitable initial or boundary conditions, this system could be solved without further
discussion. Unfortunately, an initial condition approach is problematic for several reasons.
First of all, we have no a priori basis for determining the price interval on which equilibrium
bids and asks overlap. Without knowing either pl or ph, we don't have a starting point for
the solver. In principle, this problem is not insurmountable, as we could adopt a forward-
shooting approach of \guessing" an appropriate pl, solving the dierential equations, checking
for consistency at ph, and repeating until a pl yielding consistent solutions was found.
46Unfortunately, this approach is unsuitable here because this system of dierential equa-
tions is unstable at its endpoints. To see this, observe that  (p) > (p) (because b(S) <
a(S)), so pl is dened by (pl) = Sl, and ph is dened by  (ph) = Sh. (In other words, the
endpoints of the overlapping region are dened by the ask price at the lowest possible signal
and the bid price at the highest possible signal. For the 0 equation, this means that at pl
we have F (j)jp=pl = F (Sl j (pl)) = 0, so unless + p+c also vanishes at pl, the ask
function a(S) has innite slope at Sl.39 For similar reasons,  (S) potentially approaches Sh
with innite slope. Consequently, starting the integration from either endpoint is likely to
amplify numerical errors and any misspecication of initial conditions, making convergence
to a consistent solution dicult to obtain.
The solution is to appeal once more to symmetry. Note that in our experiments, signals
are distributed symmetrically about a mean of 25, and the mean value for the item is 50.
(We are using concrete numbers here for clarity only { the argument does not depend on
the particular numbers.) Consider the function h() = (50   )+ (50 + ). The solution
to the dierential equations is symmetric about the point (p;S) = (50;25) if h() = 50 for
all . Furthermore, if the following two conditions are true { (a) h() = 50 ) h0 () = 0,
and (b) there exists some 
 such that h(
) = 50 { then we must have h() = 50 for all .
(That is, symmetry at one point, plus (a), implies symmetry everywhere.) Demonstrating
(a) is simply a matter of dierentiating h, plugging in the equations for 0 and 
0, and
properly appealing to the symmetry of f and F { the details are omitted. Assumption (b)
follows if, for example, we are willing to assume that the highest and lowest sale prices in
equilibrium are symmetric about the mean value of the object (that is,
pl+ph
2 = 50). Since
the buy and sell sides of the market are treated completely symmetrically in this model, (b)
is a reasonable assumption, and henceforth we adopt it.40
The benet of being able to assume a symmetric solution is that we now have a natural
alternative to \shooting" trial solutions from the endpoints, where the derivatives are badly
behaved { we can shoot trial solutions forward and backward from the point of symmetry at
p = 50. There are two virtues to this: rst, neither of the derivatives is degenerate at p = 50,
and second, symmetry at p = 50 means that we only need to guess one parameter. To see
this, notice that if we start integrating the dierential equations at any arbitrary p0, we need
to specify two parameters: 0 = (p0) and 0 =  (p0). However, if we start integrating at
p = 50, we have h(0) = (50) +  (50) = 50, so once we x one of the parameters, say 0,
the other one is nailed down by symmetry. Reducing the dimension of the parameter space
39Actually, for our signal structure, f (j) also vanishes, but at a slower rate than F (j), so the
argument is still valid.
40It is entirely possible that (b) is also a necessary assumption (i.e., that equilibria treating the buy and
sell sides of the market asymmetrically do not exist). However, we don't have a proof of this.
47that must be searched to nd a consistent solution dramatically simplies the computational
burden.
A.2 Step 2: Second Order Conditions
We conrmed analytically that the second order conditions are satised. Since the calculation
is routine but tedious we omit it here, but the details are available from the authors upon
request.
A.3 Step 3
For some parameters and some initial conditions, the solutions (p) and  (p) map onto S.
More typically, either (P) or  (P) or both will be a strict subset of S. In this case, we
need to extend one or both of the strategies. The rst criterion for these extensions is that
they must be best responses. If there are multiple best responses, we use the freedom to
choose extensions that do not \break" the candidate equilibrium constructed at Step 1. A
few examples may help to illustrate.
Suppose that A and B 2 [10;40] (as in treatment GT2) and that our dierential equation
solution has (p) = Ah <  (p) = 40 for some p. Extending the dierential equation
solution above p is inappropriate since B is never greater than 40, but we still need to
assign ask strategies for signals A 2 (Ah;40]. Since (by assumption) type Ah nds it optimal
to trade with probability zero, so does any A > Ah. These types are indierent among any
ask prices weakly greater than p. Were we (for example) to set a(A) = p for all of these
types, we would tempt buyers who are prescribed bids just below p to poach this pool of
sellers, disrupting the separating part of the equilibrium. By instead setting a(A) = 100 for
A 2 (Ah;40], we remove this temptation.
Alternatively, suppose that we have  (p) = Bh < (p) = 40. Thus buyers with signal
Bh buy with probability 1. We need to extend b() to cover buyers with signals B 2 (Bh;40].
Standard arguments indicate that these buyers prefer bidding p rather than bidding any
lower price (since they are more optimistic about V than Bh buyers). Furthermore, they
strictly prefer bidding p over any higher bid (since a higher bid simply means paying more
to win with probability 1). Thus, in this case we must set b(B) = p for B 2 (Bh;40].
B The Learning Phase
The learning phase of our experiments plays a supporting but critical role in our study.
Our analysis of the trading phase presumes that subjects have had at least some success
48in learning how the two clues and the asset value are related. Here we present results on
subjects' accuracy in predicting the asset value from one or two clues during the learning
phase.
Recall that this phase consisted of two sets of rounds, 1-15 and 16-30. For the rst 15
rounds, we presented a subject with one clue (A for 15 rounds or B for 15 rounds), then
asked her to predict V , and nally showed her the actual value of V . Subjects exposed to
A and to B would have seen dierent sample paths of (clue, value) pairs, but of course all
of these pairs were generated from the same symmetric distribution. The second 15 rounds
were the same, except that all subjects were shown both clues. A table of sample data
was presented before round 1 (sample pairs (A;V ) or (B;V )) and before round 16 (sample
triples (A;B;V )) to give subjects some \preloaded" information before they had to make
predictions. Subjects were rewarded for prediction accuracy according to a quadratic loss
function.
We dene a subject's prediction error to be the absolute value of the dierence between
her prediction and the true value of the asset, jVt   preditj, where predit is subject i's predic-
tion in round t. Remember that the distribution of the asset value and clues diered between
treatments B1 and GT1 versus B2 and GT2, but between B1 and GT1, the learning phase
was completely identical. (Similarly, the learning phase for B2 and GT2 was identical.) For
this reason, we form two sets of pooled data: B1/GT1 and B2/GT2.41 Table B1 presents
trends in the mean prediction error for these two groups, aggregated into ve-round blocks.
Prediction errors begin at around 15 in both groups and decline with experience. The decline
is dramatic for the treatments with low noise, but only modest for the treatments with high
noise. Furthermore, treatments B1 and GT1 show a sharp improvement at round 16, when
both clues are introduced, that is completely absent in B2 and GT2. This is sensible: since
V varies more with each clue in B1/GT1, the improvement in prediction from a second clue
is greater.
Table B1: Mean Prediction Error in the Learning Phase
Rounds
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
Treatment B1/GT1 14.48 10.72 11.69 3.89 3.04 2.93
Treatment B2/GT2 15.26 12.93 11.07 14.77 12.48 11.33
These cross-treatment comparisons need to be qualied because some of the dierence
41The procedures were identical in all treatments. Therefore, the only dierence between the two pools
consisted in the distribution of the asset value and the clues. The learning phase in CE and CU was totally
identical to that of B2/GT2. We do not discuss it here but only note that the results are not signicantly
dierent from those of B2/GT2.
49between B1/GT1 and B2/GT2 reects dierent levels of white noise in V . A perfect fore-
caster who sees both clues and has learned that V = A + B + X will make a predic-
tion equal to E (V jA;B) = A + B, resulting in a prediction error of jXj. Since X is
larger in B2/GT2 (U [ 20;20] versus U [ 3;3]), even a perfect forecaster will perform worse
in these treatments relative to B1/GT1. A better cross-treatment comparison would be
to ask how well subjects perform relative to the best feasible prediction with both clues,
E (V jA;B) = A + B. To examine this question, we form the adjusted prediction error,
jAt + Bt   preditj = j(Vt   Xt)   preditj. Table B2 presents the average adjusted prediction
errors for the two groups in rounds 1-15 and 16-30. We also compute these averages ses-
sion by session. With ve sessions per treatment, we have ten independent observations for
each group (B1/GT1 and B2/GT2) of the average adjusted prediction error. The bottom
part of the table gives the results from a Wilcoxon rank sum test of the equality of the
mean adjusted prediction error across the two specications. Equality is strongly rejected:
predictions under B1/GT1 are slightly (but signicantly) worse than under B2/GT2 when
subjects see only one clue, but are substantially better than B2/GT2 when subjects see both
clues. The average improvement in the adjusted error with a second clue is positive for both
groups, but much larger for B1/GT1 (9.68 (s.e. 0.53) versus 2.30 (s.e. 0.43)).
Table B2: Average Adjusted Prediction Error
Rounds
1-15 16-30
Treatment B1/GT1 12.20 2.52
Treatment B2/GT2 10.06 7.75
Wilcoxon Test






The rank sum for the Wilcoxon test is reported. The corresponding p   value is in parentheses.
Table B3: Standard Deviation of the Adjusted Prediction Error
Rounds
1-15 16-30
Treatment B1/GT1 9.84 5.03
Treatment B2/GT2 8.72 7.06
Wilcoxon Test






The rank sum for the Wilcoxon test is reported. The corresponding p   value is in parentheses.
We are also interested in how much variation there is in prediction accuracy. For each
50session s we compute the standard deviation s of the adjusted prediction error in rounds
1-15 and 16-30. As above, this gives us ten observations per time period for B1/GT1 and ten
for B2/GT2. Table B3 presents Wilcoxon estimates for the equality of the average standard
deviations in B1/GT1 and B2/GT2. Variation in accuracy declines in both specications,
but again the change is larger for the less noisy pair of treatments. With one clue, adjusted
errors are slightly (and not signicantly) more dispersed in B1/GT1, but with both clues,
the variance in errors is signicantly smaller in B1/GT1 relative to B2/GT2.
Overall, the results give the impression that subjects are reasonably successful in learning
to use the clues to predict the asset value. In particular, they converge fairly tightly on quite
good predictions when they have both clues and there is relatively little noise confounding
their feedback. When feedback is noisier (B2 and GT2), the results suggest a certain degree
of model uncertainty that subjects never fully overcome: their predictions improve less over
time and with a second clue, and tend to be more dispersed than is the case with less noise.
C Instructions
The instructions were divided into two parts: Part I, for the Learning Phase, and Part II,
for the Trading Phase. Part I was identical for all treatments. Part II dierred for the clues
given to subjects and for the absence or presence of gains from trade. Here we report the
instructions used for treatments B1 and B2 and the parts changed for the other treatments.
C.1 Instructions (Part I)
Welcome to our experiment!
Please, read these instructions carefully. Take all the time you want to go through them.
Make sure you understand everything. If you have a question, please, do not hesitate to raise
your hand. We will be happy to come to you and answer it privately. Please, do not ask
your neighbours and do not try to look at their screens.
You are participating in an economics experiment in which you interact with seven other
participants. Depending on your choices, the other participants' choices and some luck you
can earn a considerable amount of money. You will receive the money immediately after the
experiment. Notice that all participants have the same instructions.
51The experiment
This experiment consists of two parts. In the rst part you will learn something about
how to assess the value of a good. In the second part you will be given the opportunity to
trade this good with the other participants. Therefore, what you are going to learn in the
rst part will be useful in the second part of the experiment.
We will start by explaining the rst part. When all of you have read these instructions,
we will start running the rst part. After that, we will give you further instructions for the
second part, and then we will continue and run the second part.
The Experiment { Part I
In this part of the experiment we will ask you to predict the value of a good. We will
give you some clues that will help you in your task.
You will have to make your predictions 30 times (in 30 rounds). In each of these rounds,
the computer will choose a new value for the good and you will have to predict it. The
computer chooses the value of the good in each round afresh. The value of the good in one
round never depends on the value of the good in one of the previous rounds. However, the
value of the good does depend on several factors. We will call two of these factors \clue A"
and \clue B"; before making your prediction, you will have the chance to observe one or
both of these clues. Because the value of the good depends on factors other than clue A and
clue B, you should not expect to be able to make perfect predictions, even when you can
observe both of these clues. Here are some more details about the value of the good and the
information you will receive.
First of all, the value of the good will never be lower than 0 or higher than 100.
Second, in each of the rst 15 rounds, you will receive one clue { either A or B. In
contrast, during the last 15 rounds, you will receive both clue A and clue B. Your clue (or
clues) will be a number (or two numbers) that appears on your screen at the beginning of
each round. Both of these clues are related to the true value of the good, but we will not
tell you how they are related { you must discover this through experience.
What you have to do
You have only one task: try to predict the correct value of the good.
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In each of these rounds the computer will draw the value of the good, which will be a
number between 0 and 100. You will not be told this number. However, on your screen
you will see your clue, a number related to this value. After you see it, you can input your
prediction. Note that, to input this value, you can use the mouse and also (to select the
number more precisely) the up and down arrows at the bottom-right of the keyboard.
Procedures for each of the last 15 rounds
In the last 15 rounds you will have to do exactly the same. However, instead of seeing
one clue, you will see two of them, the one that you always saw in the rst 15 rounds and
a new one. Again, after you see them, you can make your decision, that is, you can input
your prediction.
You do not have to rush. Take all the time you want to make your decision.
Remark 1
In the rst 15 rounds all of you will receive only one clue. Note, however, that four of you
will receive (for all 15 rounds) clue A and the other four will receive clue B. Who receives
one clue and who the other is decided randomly by the computer. In the last 15 rounds
everyone receives both clues.
Remark 2
Remember that the value that the computer chooses in one round is completely inde-
pendent of the value it chose in previous rounds or will choose in the next rounds. In every
round the computer chooses a new value.
What do you earn for your predictions?
Your earnings in this rst part depend on how well you predict the value of the good.
For the rst 10 rounds, given that you are learning, your performance will not aect your
payment. In the rounds from the 11th through the 15th, your ability to predict the value
will be important. In fact, the computer will randomly choose one of these rounds and we
will pay you according to what you did in that round. Notice that the computer will select
the same round for all of you. If in that round you predict the value exactly, you will earn
$3.00. If your prediction diers from the true value by an amount x, you will earn $3.00
{ 0.003x2. This means that the further your prediction is from the true value, the less you
53will earn. Moreover, if your mistake is small, you will be penalized only a small amount; if
your mistake is big, you will be penalized more than proportionally.
Analogously, your performance in the rounds from the 16th through the 25th will not
directly aect your payo, as you are learning how to use two clues. In contrast, your payo
will depend on your predictions in the rounds from the 26th through the 30th. As above,
the computer will randomly choose one of these rounds and we will pay you according to
what you did in that round. We will pay you using the same rule explained above.
To make this rule clear, let us see some examples.
Example 1: Suppose the true value is 50.
Suppose you predict 70. In this case you made a mistake of 20. We will give you $3.00
{ 0.003*202 = $3.00 { $1.20 = $1.80. Similarly, if your prediction was 30, again you made
a mistake of 20. And again we will give you $3.00 { $1.20 = $1.80.
Example 2: Suppose the true value is 65.
Suppose you predict 55. In this case you made a mistake of 10. We will give you $3.00
{ 0.003*102 = $3.00 { $0.30 = $2.70. Similarly, if your prediction was 75, again you made
a mistake of 10 and, again, we will pay you $3.00 { $0.30 = $2.70.
Example 3: Suppose the true value is 24.
Suppose you predict 55. In this case you made a mistake of 31. We will give you $3.00
{ 0.003*312 = $3.00 { $2.88 = $0.12.
How do you learn?
Before the rst round, we will show you a table with a sample of 10 values for the good
and for the clue. The computer generated these values in the same way in which it will
generate new values for you. Therefore, this may be helpful in predicting the values in the
rst rounds. Similarly, immediately before the 16th round, we will show you a table with 10
values for the good and the two clues. Again, this will help you before you start predicting
the value of the good using two clues.
Moreover, after each round, of course, we will inform you of the true value of the good.
Therefore, you will be able to compare your prediction with the truth. This may help you
to improve your ability to make good predictions in later rounds. Again, you should not
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on other factors besides the two clues.
Finally, at the end of this part of the experiment, your screen will display the two rounds
that the computer chose for everyone to be paid. You will also see your own payo for these
two rounds.
C.2 Instructions (Part II)
Thank you for participating in the rst part of the experiment. Now, we will start the second
part. Please, read these instructions carefully and ask us if they are not clear. As for the
rst part, of course, all participants have the same instructions.
The Experiment { Part II
What you have to do
This part of the experiment consists of a series of 30 rounds. You will interact with
the other people who participated in part I. In each round you will have to make a simple
decision. You will have to choose a price at which you are willing to sell a good and a price
at which you are willing to buy it. Your sell price can be greater than or equal to your buy
price, but it cannot be lower. In each round you will be matched with other four participants
in the experiment. If the price at which you want to buy is higher than the price at which
any of these other participants with whom you are matched wants to sell, then trade will
occur: you will obtain the good and will have to pay a price equal to the average of your
\buy" oer and his \sell" oer. Similarly, if the price at which you want to sell is lower than
the price at which any other of these four participants want to buy, trade will occur: you will
obtain a price equal to the average of the other participant's buy oer and your sell oer.
Notice that, given that you are matched with other four people, it may happen that you
trade (buy or sell) with some of them and not with others. Moreover, given that these other
participants can choose dierent prices, it is well possible that you sell to some people and
buy from others.
It is also possible that neither you nor any of the other participants you are matched
with makes a buy oer that is at least as high as the price at which the other one oers to
sell. In that case, there will be no exchange of the good at all.
55In conclusion, there are 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4 participants.
What determines the value of the good
In the previous part of the experiment you have already seen how the value of the good
is related to the information that you receive. The rules do not change: the value of the
good is determined exactly as it was in the previous part.
What you earn in a round
First of all, we will give you 20 pence per round, regardless of whether trade occurs or
not. In addition to this, you earn prots or losses on any trade that you make.
Therefore, in rounds without trade you will just earn the 20 pence that we give you. You
will not earn more money and you will not lose it either.
When you buy a good from another participant, your prot or loss will be equal to the
true value of the good minus the price you paid for it.
Similarly, when you sell a good to someone, your prot or loss will be equal to the price
that you receive minus the true value of the good.
Clearly, given that in a round you can trade with 1, 2, 3 or 4 people, for each of these
trades you can earn prots or suer losses.
With whom you are matched
Remember that there are 8 participants in this experiment. In the rst part of the
experiment, in the rst 15 rounds, four of you received information only on clue A and four
only on clue B. Now, in each round, the computer will match you with the four people who
received the other clue. For instance, if you are a participant who received information only
on clue A in those rst 15 rounds, you will be matched with participants who saw only clue
B. If you received clue B, you will be matched with those who saw only clue A.
What information you receive
In this part of the experiment, we will let you know only one clue on the value of the
good. If in the rst 15 rounds of the previous part of the experiment you received only clue
A, now you will see clue A only. Similarly, if you received information on clue B, again you
will see clue B only.
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Remember that the experiment is organized into dierent rounds and that within each
round you will have to choose two prices, one for buying and one for selling. So, let us
summarize what happens within each round.
1) At the beginning of each round the computer randomly chooses the value of the good
as well as values for the two clues A and B. You will see one of the two clues on the screen.
2) Now you make your decision: select on your screen the price at which you would be
willing to sell the good and the price at which you would be willing to buy it. There is only
one restriction: the price at which you accept to buy cannot be greater than the price at
which you want to sell. Notice that, obviously, the higher the price at which you want to
sell and the lower the price at which you want to buy, the lower is the possibility that trade
will actually occur. In particular, if you want to be sure of not trading, you can just click on
a `no trade' button on your screen. By clicking on that button, the prices will automatically
go to the extremes, 0 and 100. Obviously, at those prices, trade never occurs, regardless of
what prices the other participants select and you will simply keep your 20 pence.
4) The computer will compare your prices to those of the four participants with whom you
are matched. Below we will call these participants the \Other Participants." By comparing
these prices the computer will determine whether there will be exchange of the good or not
between you and any of them.
5) On your screen, you will see your prices, the Other Participants' prices, the true value
of the good and your payo.
Once the rst round is over, we will repeat the same procedure for the second round. At
the beginning, the computer will choose again values for the good and the two clues. You
will choose your buy and sell prices. You will be informed of your payo.
Examples of payo
Example 1
Suppose that in a round you choose a price for buying of 30 pence and a price for selling
of 40 pence. Suppose also that:
1) The rst of the Other Participants chooses a price for buying of 50 pence and a
price for selling of 65 pence.
572) The second chooses a price for buying of 10p and a price for selling of 20p.
3) The third, a price for buying of 20p and a price for selling of 85p.
4) The fourth, a price for buying of 0p and a price for selling of 100p.
In this case, given that the rst `Other Participant' is willing to buy at a higher price
than you are willing to sell, there will be trade between the two of you: the Other Participant
will buy the asset from you. You will receive a price of 45p (which is exactly the midpoint
between 40p and 50p).
After you have made your decisions you will be informed of the true value of the good:
suppose it is 38p. In this case, your prot from this trade will be
(price { true value) =
(0.45 { 0.38) = 0.07
By selling the asset in this case you make a prot, as you sold for 45p something that
was worth only 38p.
The second Other Participant is willing to sell at a lower price than you are willing to
buy, therefore, there will be trade between the two of you: the `Other Participant' will sell
the asset to you. You will pay a price of 25p (which is exactly the midpoint between 20p
and 30p).
Your prot for this trade will be
(true value { price) =
(0.38 { 0.25) = 0.13.
By buying the asset in this case you make a prot, as you bought for 25p something that
was worth 38p.
What happens with the third Other Participant? You do not sell to him, as his buy price
is less than your sell price (20 < 30). Likewise, he does not sell to you, as your buy price
is less than his sell price (30 < 85). Similarly, you do not buy and do not sell to the fourth
Participant.
Finally, your Per Round Payo will be:
0.20 +0.07 + 0.13 = 0.40
Example 2
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of 60 pence. Suppose also that the rst of the Other Participants chooses a price for buying
of 70 pence and a price for selling of 75 pence.
In this case, given that the rst `Other Participant' is willing to buy at a higher price
than you are willing to sell, there will be trade between the two of you: the Other Participant
will buy the asset from you. You will receive a price of 65p (which is exactly the midpoint
between 60p and 70p).
After you have made your decisions you will be informed of the true value of the good:
suppose it is 78p. In this case, your prot from this trade will be
(price { true value) =
(0.65 { 0.78) = { 0.13
By selling the asset in this case you make a loss. You lose 13p because you sold the good
at a price below its true value.
What happens with the other participants depends on their prices, as in the example
above.
Example 3
Suppose that there is a round in which you do not wish to trade with anyone under any
circumstances. You choose a buy price of 0 and a sell price of 100p. Since it is impossible
for the Other Participants' sell price to be less than 0 or for their buy price to be greater
than 100, you can be assured that you will not trade in this round with anyone.
Your nal payo
Your total payo at the end of the experiment will computed as follows.
Just for taking part in the experiment, you earn a show up fee of $5.00.
You have earned some money in the rst part of the experiment.
Finally, you have earned the per-round payos in these 30 rounds.
We will just add all these amounts:
Total Payment = $5.00 + Money earned in Part I + Sum of Per Round Payos in Part
II.
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In treatments GT1 and GT2 the instructions were changed in regard to the explanation of
earnings as shown below. Of course, also the examples of payos were amended accordingly.
What you earn in a round
First of all, we will give you 20 pence per round, regardless of whether trade occurs or
not. In addition to this, you earn prots or losses on any trade that you make.
Therefore, in rounds without trade you will just earn the 20 pence that we give you. You
will not earn more money and you will not lose it either.
When you buy a good from another participant, your prot or loss will be equal to the
true value of the good minus the price you paid for it, plus an additional 5 pence which you
earn simply because a trade occurred.
Similarly, when you sell a good to someone, your prot or loss will be equal to the price
that you receive minus the true value of the good, once again plus an additional 5 pence
which you earn simply because a trade occurred.
Clearly, given that in a round you can trade with 1, 2, 3 or 4 people, for each of these




Suppose that in a round you choose a price for buying of 30 pence and a price for selling
of 40 pence. Suppose also that:
1) The rst of the Other Participants chooses a price for buying of 50 pence and a
price for selling of 65 pence.
2) The second chooses a price for buying of 10p and a price for selling of 20p.
3) The third, a price for buying of 20p and a price for selling of 85p.
4) The fourth, a price for buying of 0p and a price for selling of 100p.
In this case, given that the rst `Other Participant' is willing to buy at a higher price
than you are willing to sell, there will be trade between the two of you: the Other Participant
60will buy the asset from you. You will receive a price of 45p (which is exactly the midpoint
between 40p and 50p).
After you have made your decisions you will be informed of the true value of the good:
suppose it is 38p. In this case, your prot from this trade will be
(price { true value) + 5 pence =
(0.45 { 0.38) + 0.05 = 0.07 + 0.05 = 0.12
By selling the asset in this case you make a prot, as you sold for 45p something that
was worth only 38p. In addition, you get the extra 5 pence because trade occurred with this
Participant.
The second Other Participant is willing to sell at a lower price than you are willing to
buy, therefore, there will be trade between the two of you: the `Other Participant' will sell
the asset to you. You will pay a price of 25p (which is exactly the midpoint between 20p
and 30p).
Your prot for this trade will be
(true value { price) + 5 pence =
(0.38 { 0.25) + 0.05 = 0.13 + 0.05 = 0.18.
By buying the asset in this case you make a prot, as you bought for 25p something that
was worth 38p, and, in addition, you get the extra 5 pence because trade occurred with this
Participant.
What happens with the third Other Participant? You do not sell to him, as his buy price
is less than your sell price (20 < 30). Likewise, he does not sell to you, as your buy price
is less than his sell price (30 < 85). Similarly, you do not buy and do not sell to the fourth
Participant.
Finally, your Per Round Payo will be:
0.20 +0.12 + 0.18 = 0.50
Example 2
Suppose that in a round you choose a price for buying of 40 pence and a price for selling
of 60 pence. Suppose also that the rst of the Other Participants chooses a price for buying
of 70 pence and a price for selling of 75 pence.
61In this case, given that the rst `Other Participant' is willing to buy at a higher price
than you are willing to sell, there will be trade between the two of you: the Other Participant
will buy the asset from you. You will receive a price of 65p (which is exactly the midpoint
between 60p and 70p).
After you have made your decisions you will be informed of the true value of the good:
suppose it is 78p. In this case, your prot from this trade will be
(price { true value) + 5 pence =
(0.65 { 0.78) + 0.05 = { 0.13 + 0.05 = { 0.08
By selling the asset in this case you make a loss. You get 5p because trade occurred, but
also lose 13p because you sold the good at a price below its true value, for a net payo of -
8p.
What happens with the other participants depends on their prices, as in the example
above.
Example 3
Suppose that there is a round in which you do not wish to trade with anyone under any
circumstances. You choose a buy price of 0 and a sell price of 100p. Since it is impossible
for the Other Participants' sell price to be less than 0 or for their buy price to be greater
than 100, you can be assured that you will not trade in this round with anyone.
C.4 Changes to Instructions for Treatments CE and CU
In Treatments CE and CU the instructions were changed in regard to the information that
subjects received. In Treatment CE, the instructions were changed as follows:
What information you receive
In this part of the experiment, you will receive both clues A and B. This is true for every
participant, of course.
In Treatment CU, the change was the following:
What information you receive
In this part of the experiment, you will receive dierent information in odd rounds and
even rounds. If in the rst 15 rounds of Part I of the experiment you received only clue
62A, now in odd rounds (1,3,5,7...) you will see clue A only. In contrast, if you received
information on clue B only, now you will see both clues A and B. The reverse occurs in even
rounds. If in the rst 15 rounds of Part I of the experiment you received only clue A, now
in even rounds (2,4,6,8...) you will see both clues A and B. In contrast, if you received
information on clue B only, now you will see clue B only. Clearly, since you are matched
with participants who saw the other clue in the rst 15 rounds of Part I, whenever you see
only one clue, your matches see them both. Whenever you see both, your matches see only
one.
C.5 Computer Screen Shots
Figure 2: Table with a sample of 10 asset values and the corresponding clue A
63Figure 3: Table with a sample of 10 asset values and the corresponding clue B
Figure 4: Table with a sample of 10 asset values and the corresponding clues A and B
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